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Digital Sampling: The Copyright
Considerations of a New Technological
Use of Musical Performance
by JEFFREY S. NEWTON*
Introduction
Digital sampling is a process that records and stores sounds
in computer memory and permits them to be recalled, edited,
and utilized as the sound source for a synthesizer. This Note
explains the sampling process and its uses in music, and ex-
plores the copyright and intellectual property issues involved.
I.
Sampling Technology
A. The Physics of Recorded Sound
1. The Acoustical Nature of Sound
"Reduced to its essential physical nature, sound is no more
than a pressure fluctuation in the air."1 Air pressure fluctua-
tions are translated into nerve impulses in the ear, which the
brain interprets as sound.2 Air pressure fluctuations (sound)
"can be expressed graphically by means of a waveform ....
Sounds perceived as having a definite pitch "have waveforms
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State Bar of Michigan, and Jazz musician. The author would like to thank the Los
Angeles County Bar Association and the members of its Committee on Patents,
Trademarks, and Unfair Competition for sponsoring the Entertainment Law Writing
Competition, and the editorial board of Comm/Ent for their participation in the
Competition. An earlier version of this Note was awarded First Prize in the 1987
Nathan Burkan Memorial Copyright Competition (ASCAP) at the University of
Michigan School of Law. The author would like to express his appreciation to Pro-
fessor Layman Allen, for whom the note was originally written, and to Professor
Jessica Litman, for her interest in the subject, encouragement, and advice in the
preparation of the manuscript.
1. Mathews & Pierce, The Computer as a Musical Instrument, Sci. AM., Feb.
1987, at 126.
2. Id
3. Id. A waveform is "a plot of how the ambient air pressure varies as a func-
tion of time." Id.
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that exhibit a nearly periodic variation in pressure. The pitch
of a sound corresponds directly to the variation's frequency of
repetition. '4 For example, the note A above middle C on the
piano is produced by a pressure variation that repeats 440
times per second. Timberal (or "tonal color") variations be-
tween different musical instruments or different players of
the same instrument producing the same pitch result from
variations in a waveform's contours (or "envelope"), the de-
gree to which harmonic overtones (or "partials") are present,
and the interrelation of these concepts. A distinct musical
sound is therefore produced by a "complex periodic wave-
form."5
2. Analog Recording
When sound is recorded by an analog storage system, such
as magnetic tape, air pressure fluctuations are translated into
signals which vary the voltage of an electrical current. When
this current is applied to an electromagnet, ferrous oxide par-
ticles in a magnetic tape passed over the electromagnet form
patterns, thus encoding the tape. The encoded information
can be retranslated into electrical signals by passing the tape
over an electromagnet connected to an amplifier. When the
amplified signals are converted into air pressure fluctuations
through a loudspeaker, the brain perceives them as a close ap-
proximation of the original sound.6
3. Digital Recording
Digital recording reproduces sound by expressing wave-
forms in terms of binary numbers. Air pressure fluctuations
expressed as electrical signals are translated into a sequence of
numbers in proportion to the signal's voltage, which is en-
coded and stored in computer memory.7 When the numerical
4. Id.
5. Id. at 128-29. Fundamental frequencies exhibit pure "sine" waves. However,
the Fourier Theorem states that "all complex, periodic waveforms are composed of a
harmonic series of sine waves." Di Perna, Gourmet Sampling: A Culinary Course
for Weekend Chefs, MUSICIAN, Special Edition: Understanding MIDI 2, 1987, at 56.
The presence of a tone's various partials vary throughout its envelope. Mathews &
Pierce, supra note 1, at 128-29.
6. Mathews & Pierce, supra note 1, at 126.
7. Id. at 127. See generally id. at 126 (discussion of the Sampling Theorem,
upon which the exact numerical representation of waveforms is premised); Di
Perna, supra note 5, at 56 (stating that a sampled waveform's accuracy increases in
proportion to the sampler's "input sample rate," a measure of the number of times
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sequence is retranslated into electrical signals that are then
filtered (or "smoothed") into a continuous waveform, 8 "any
perceptible sound [can] conceivably be [re]produced in all its
acoustic intricacy."9 Compact discs, digital audio tape, and dig-
ital sampling all use this method of storing and retrieving
data.
II.
The Digital Revolution in Music
A. The Pervasiveness of Sampling
Digital recording reproduces sound with greater sonic fidel-
ity than does analog recording. 10 Additionally, digital record-
ings are much more useful in the production of music than are
analog recordings." A "digital sample" is a short digital re-
cording of a particular sound source, ranging from a few
milliseconds to approximately two and one-half minutes in
length.' The recording may be stored in floppy disc or ran-
per second an inputted waveform's amplitude is measured by an analog-to-digital
converter).
8. Such digital filtering "reconnects" the series of numerically stored amplitude
values to recreate the original analog waveform, but a theoretical deviation from the
original waveform occurs when amplitude values falling between the available nu-
merical gradations are rounded off (or "quantized"); this is audibly perceptible if the
degree of "quantizing error" is high. Di Perna, supra note 5, at 57.
9. Mathews & Pierce, supra note 1, at 126.
10. Id. at 127.
11. The Mellotron, developed in the early seventies, was the analog forerunner
of the digital sampling keyboard. Prerecorded tapes of real instrumental sounds or
voices were triggered by keyboard manipulation. Kinkel, Digital Sampling (pt. 1),
MusIc & SOUND OUTPUT, Nov. 1985, at 26-28. A sampler resembles a Mellotron
more than it does a conventional synthesizer, since a sampler utilizes sound record-
ings, but does not create them. See generally Levy, Push-Button Rock, ROLLING
STONE, Nov. 21, 1985, at 89, 108 (describing use of multi-track tape recorders in com-
mercial music production).
12. Kinkel, supra note 11, at 26. Single notes, musical phrases, and rhythmic
patterns may all be sampled and manipulated to suit various compositions. Because
sampling length is dependent upon a unit's memory capacity, this figure can be ex-
pected to increase in the future. See generally infra text accompanying notes 160-75
(discussion of the implications of 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (1982) on sample length). A
sampled waveform can be used throughout a keyboard's entire range by varying the
rate at which a digital-to-analog converter retranslates the sample to analog format.
Di Perna, supra note 5, at 56. However, instruments with large ranges and complex
waveforms require multiple samples of relatively long duration to accurately
reproduce the intricate harmonic subtlety of their tone colors. Thus, an accurate
saxophone multi-sample requires longer and more frequent recordings than does a
snare drum sample. See generally infra text accompanying notes 160-75 (discussion
of the implications of this phenomenon on 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (1982)). Cf. infra text
1989]
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dom access memory chip format, and used as a sound source
when triggered by a "tactile controller."' 3
The use of sampled sound sources as a replacement for
traditional acoustic instruments has become widespread in the
last few years,'14 despite the samplists' contradictory asser-
tions. 5 However, sampling is not limited to emulating conven-
tional instruments. Samples can also be edited or combined
with other sound sources, sampled or otherwise, to create new
sounds.16 Additionally, digital recordings can be programmed
to produce rhythmic patterns, simulating a musician's tech-
nique.17 The "digital revolution" has changed commercial pop
music from a performing to a recording art,'" and is even infil-
accompanying notes 114-23 (discussion of multi-sampling and compilation copyrights
for samples in database format).
13. Kinkel, supra note 11, at 27. Keyboards, drum machines, and digital delay
(reverb) units are the three primary sampling "controllers." Id. at 26-28.
14. The musicians who perform on these instruments are similarly being re-
placed, and an acoustic musician could conceivably be replaced by a sample of their
own playing. Machines now create at least 50 percent of the music on television
commercials and "recording jobs for acoustic performers have fallen off by about 35
percent in the last three years, largely due to synthesizers." Jalon, Will Synthesiz-
ers Put Musicians Out Of Business?, Ann Arbor News, Dec. 28, 1985, at B1, col. 1
(source: Recording Musicians of America) (article also discusses the difficulty of pro-
tecting acoustic musicians' employment by labor contract). Studio session wages de-
clined by 7.5% in 1986, the eighth consecutive year of decline. Horowitz, Session
Wages Drop 7.595, BILLBOARD, Aug. 2, 1986, at 1. See also Reich, Send in the Clones,
The Brave New Art of Stealing Musical Sounds, Chicago Tribune, Feb. 15, 1987, § 13
(The Arts Magazine), at 8, 9 (arguing that the musicians' union lacks power to re-
verse this trend, partly because both synthesists and acoustic musicans belong to the
union); Tully, A Sampling of Sampling, Mix, Jan. 1987, at 49, 52 (noting various non-
sampling methods of synthesis).
15. Reich, supra note 14, at 8, 9 (synthesists admit samplers will cause unem-
ployment, but contend that samplers can't imitate acoustic instruments). Perhaps
acoustic musicians will suffer unemployment because their instruments will eventu-
ally sound bizarre to the listening public.
16. Id. See generally infra text accompanying notes 176-97 (implications of the
doctrine of substantial similarity on sample combining and editing).
17. See generally Di Perna, supra note 5 (describing the recording devices and
communications protocol that enable multiple digitally-based instruments to be se-
quenced simultaneously); Miller, The Irreplaceable Drum, INT'L MUSICIAN, Jan.
1987, at 13.
18. Traditional musical ability and training are neither necessary nor sufficient
prerequisites for the creation of digital music, as sequencers can be programmed in
either "real time," as in actually playing an instrument, or in "step time," where
each component of musical expression is input separately. See generally infra sec.
V(D) (discussion of the implications of 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (1982) on "real time" se-
quencing). In sequencing, pitch and tempo are independent variables; sequences can
be programmed at any speed and in any key, and later altered electronically. Id. As
a result, "live musicians... often find themselves in the awkward position of having
to ... re-create the music of computers originally programmed to sound like humans
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trating the domain of the symphony orchestra. 9 In fact, this
"electro-musical toy of choice for the '80's 2 has become so
pervasive that sampling is now "indispensable in the music in-
dustry, [and is] used on every record in the Top 40.' ' 21 Such
widespread use raises the question of whether musicians may
obtain copyright protection of their tone colors and therefore
prohibit sampling without their consent. Regardless of the
medium in which sampling is employed, the methods by which
samples are acquired and used determine the scope of federal
copyright protection available.
B. Sample Acquisition and Use
Even samples acquired with explicit consent may present
legal problems in the copyright arena.22 However, much sam-
pling is performed surreptitiously, either live or from record-
playing real instruments. Often, the human beings aren't up to it; and the synthe-
sizer or drum-machine parts are preset and programmed before [a] show." Levy,
supra note 11, at 110. Cf. Alvaro, What is Musical Property? The Ethics of Sam-
pling, KEYBOARD, Oct. 1986, at 10 ("I've worked with ... players who have spent
years trying to achieve that one perfect tone that would make their playing instantly
identifiable. But now there's an easy answer for all of you who know you could
achieve stardom, if only you could get that extra punch in your sound. Sample it.")
(emphasis original).
19. The current repertoire of French composer and conductor Pierre Boulez in-
cludes works for orchestra and computer-generated sound. Mathews & Pierce,
supra note 1, at 126. Even musical art forms such as jazz improvisation, in which
composition and performance combine simultaneously, are not immune. Artificial
intelligence based "expert systems" are now being developed that respond to "tactile
controller" input data, such as a soloist, to interpret the data using a set of composi-
tional rules and conditions, thus providing a "rhythm section" for the soloist. Tully,
supra note 14, at 32.
20. Tully, supra note 14, at 49.
21. Reich, supra note 14, at 8. The potential use of sampling outside the music
industry may transcend that of copyright or labor concerns. One synthesists' maga-
zine featured a "rap" re-recording of former President Reagan saying, "God's great-
est gift is human life." Id. at 9. Future technological advances may allow convincing
renditions of spurious political speech to be manufactured. Id. This use of sampling
implicates the common law doctrine of the "right of publicity," an analysis of which
is beyond the scope of this Note. See generally Marks, An Assessment of the Copy-
right Model in Right of Publicity Cases, 32 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 1 (1986).
22. Since samples may be stored, combined and infinitely varied absent contrac-
tual limitations, the end-use value of a sample far exceeds that of a recorded per-
formance. For example, keyboardist Jan Hammer, composer and creator of the
soundtrack for the hit TV show Miami Vice, sampled the unique Conga Drum
sound of his friend David Earl Johnson. The sampled drums are prominently fea-
tured in Miami Vice's theme song. Although Johnson consented to Hammer's sam-
pling, he did not consent to unfettered, uncompensated, and unlimited re-use. Reich,
supra note 14, at 8. See generally Tully, supra note 14, at 181 (discussing lack of
contractual protection in industry collective bargaining agreements against re-use).
1989]
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23ings. Due to the relative ease with which a sample may be
clandestinely acquired and duplicated, a thriving "black mar-
ket" in sample trading is blossoming across the country.24
Although the way a sample is acquired is largely irrelevant to
how useful it is to the samplist, the method of sample acquisi-
tion determines whether the act of sampling constitutes in-
fringement under the Copyright Act of 1976 (the "Copyright
Act").25 Thus, the potential legal protection against sampling
from recorded sources, live performances, radio broadcasts,
and studio recording sessions is addressed separately. Simi-
larly, the various sample end-uses are addressed separately.26
Before examining the legal protection against various sample
acquisition methods and uses, the threshold issue of sound
source copyrightability will be examined independently.
III.
The Case for Timberal (Tone Color)
Copyrightability
A. Tonal Color Variation Among Particular Instruments
Timberal differences between particular sound sources of
the same pitch result from amplitude and frequency variations
over the duration of the frequency's waveform.27 The listener
perceives these variations as the musician's or vocalist's tone.
Whether an artist succeeds in producing a distinct, recogniza-
ble tone depends to some degree upon the instrument.2' How-
But cf. Reich, supra note 14, at 8 (such protection exists for "traditional" recording
session re-use).
23. See Reich, supra note 14, at 8, 9.
24. Reich, supra note 14, at 9. See also, e.g., KEYBOARD MAGAZINE, Classified
Section, (display of advertisements for samples). Sample "bootlegging" and digital
audio tape both present many issues similar to the record piracy problems of the late
1960s, although on a more complex level. See infra text accompanying notes 150-59
(legislative history of the 1971 "Sound Recording Amendment").
25. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1982).
26. A sample may be used to replicate the artist's style, see supra note 21. Sam-
ples may be utilized in both recording and live performance situations.
27. See supra text accompanying note 5.
28. Individual vocal quality originates solely with the singer, imparting a great
degree of recognizability. The use of vocal samples may involve the right of public-
ity. See generally Marks, supra note 21. In comparison, the tone color of a piano is
perhaps more significant than the manner in which it is played.
Reed, string, and brass instruments exhibit diverse timberal differences. Although
somewhat dependent upon the particular brand of instrument, strings, reeds, and
mouthpiece used, a distinctive tone is primarily an achievement of the instrumental-
ist, and nearly impossible to alter once developed. Indeed, playing each note
[Vol. 11:671
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ever, whether tone color is sufficiently original to be afforded
protection under the Copyright Act must be determined ac-
cording to constitutional, rather than artistic, standards. The
next section examines the constitutional requirements of
copyright protection for this important musical asset.
B. The Constitutional Grant of Copyright Protection
1. The Purpose of Copyright, Authorship Considerations,
and the "Writing" Requirement
Prior to sampling, it was unnecessary to copyright tone, as
tone was useful solely to its creator. However, a sampled tim-
bre may be appropriated wholesale, potentially reducing its
commercial value to its creator.29  Before determining if the
Copyright Act affords protection for timbre, it is necessary to
determine if such protection lies within the constitutional
grant of power. To be within the scope of the constitutional
grant, protection should fall within the purpose of copyright
and be applicable to constitutional subject matter-"writings"
produced by "authors."
Granting copyright to "tone colors" would serve the textu-
ally stated purpose of copyright,30 often an important con-
throughout a wind or string instrument's range with correct intonation and a truly
distinct tone are major challenges. It is musical folklore that the truly great players
may be recognized after performing only one note. The author, a saxophonist, has
been pursuing this goal for fifteen years.
The timbre of percussion instruments varies critically among percussionists, since
an instrument is capable of a multitude of timberal colors, depending upon how it is
struck. See Alvaro, supra note 18, at 10 ("What sets Phil Collins' drums apart isn't
just technique and style; he has a sound.") (emphasis original).
Electric-modified instruments, such as electric guitar, partially derive their timbre
from electronic effects, such as wah wah pedals, distortion units, and phase shifters.
As a result, one who samples another musician's effects-unit-modified tone gleans
not only the tone per se, but also their tone as expressed by their particular use of
the effects unit. Synthesizers, which wholly derive their tone from electronic de-
vices, are treated separately. See infra text accompanying notes 104-43.
29. Indeed, the unrestricted sampling of individual timbres produced on acoustic
instruments may result in their eventual demise. Given the ease with which timbres
may be copied, the incentive to master a musical instrument, other than the sam-
pling synthesizer, indeed appears miminal.
30. The copyright clause provides that the Congress shall have power "[t]o pro-
mote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Au-
thors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Copyright serves as a reward for artistic
accomplishments and as an incentive for future artistic creation. Mazer v. Stein, 347
U.S. 201, 219 (1954). Although copyright rewards creative labor, its ultimate aim is
"to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good." Twentieth Century Mu-
sic Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975). This incentive may apply equally to the
,19891.
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sideration when statutory provisions appear ambiguous 1.3
Although it is not imperative that affording copyright protec-
tion to timbre serve the clause's textual purpose, such a grant
would do so.32 The expansive meaning ascribed to the consti-
tutional mandate that only "authors"3 3 be granted copyright
protection should include creators of timbres in the same way
that creators of "sound recordings" are already protected. 34
The term "writings" has been construed "to reflect the
broad scope of constitutional principles. '35 "Any physical ren-
dering of the fruits of creative intellectual or aesthetic labor"
is considered a "writing" for copyright purposes.3 6 Thus, to
qualify as a "writing," a work must be the product of intellec-
tual labor, no matter how minimal, and exist in some material
form.
creators of synthesizer timbres, thus promoting the creation of new and unique
sounds. See infra text accompanying notes 104-43.
31. "When technological change has rendered its literal terms ambiguous, the
Copyright Act must be construed in light of this basic purpose." Twentieth Century
Music Corp., 422 U.S. at 156. See infra text accompanying notes 47-103 (statutory
requirements).
32. It is not necessary that "each of the 'writings' protected by copyright in fact
promote science or useful arts .... [merely that] Congress shall be promoting these
ends by its copyright legislation." M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 103 [B] at
32.2 (1985).
33. The constitutional definition of an "author" for copyright purposes is "[h]e to
whom anything owes its origin; originator, maker." Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co.
v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884). Thus, one who copies from others is not an author,
although truly independent creation of a pre-existing work is not a bar to copyright-
ability. M. NIMMER, supra note 32, § 106[A] at 37. However, there is an implicit de
minimis requirement of originality. Mr. Justice Holmes has stated that
"[p]ersonality always contains something unique. It expresses its singularity even in
handwriting, and a very modest grade of art has in it something irreducible, which is
one man's alone. That something he may copyright unless there is a restriction in
the words of the act." Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250
(1903).
34. Sound recordings of artistic performances have been explicitly held to satisfy
the constitutional standard for "writings." Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546
(1973). As such, they enjoy categorical, albeit limited, statutory recognition. 17
U.S.C. § 114(b) (1982). See also infra sec. V (discussion of copyright in sound record-
ings). Similarly, computer programs enjoy explicit statutory recognition. 17 U.S.C.
§ 117 (1982). See also infra text accompanying notes 104-43 (discussion of copyright
in digital tone colors).
35. Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 561. The term comprehends "the artistic and techno-
logical developments of [a] contemporary society" if "the new subject-matter ...
ha[s] some relation to the [constitutional] grant .... for [the Constitution] is not a
strait-jacket, but a charter for a living people." Reiss v. National Quotation Bureau,
276 F. 717, 719 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
36. Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 561.
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(a) Intellectual Labor
The requirement that a writing must result from intellec-
tual labor is de minimis. 7 Although the labor must be more
than trivial, it need not be "intellectual" in the sense that the
ideas communicated must be analytically intelligible; any aes-
thetic or emotional content will suffice. 38  A vocal or in-
strumental tone, which requires years of intense study,
refinement, and practice, is clearly the product of intellectual
labor. A tone is the very essence of creativity and surely satis-
fies the minimal standard required by the copyright clause. 9
(b) Material Form
Tangibility is an explicit statutory requirement.40 Although
the copyright clause does not expressly require tangibility, a
"writing" must necessarily evince some material form.41 How-
ever, tone colors, and indeed music itself, are inherently eva-
nescent, despite the possibility of facsimilal reproductions in
tangible form.42 Tone color is an aspect of musical perform-
37. See Trademark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879). See also M. NIMMER, supra note 32,
§ 108[C] at 48 (trademarks, blank charts, facts, and simple directions are not "writ-
ings," even if they are the product of independent creation); cf Eltra Corp. v.
Ringer, 579 F.2d 294 (4th Cir. 1978) (typefaces are inseparable from intended use and
are not independent works of art, thus uncopyrightable under the 1909 Act and Ma-
zer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954)). But cf. Notice of Inquiry, 51 Fed. Reg. 36,410 (1986)
(Copyright Office request for public comments on the copyrightable elements of dig-
itized typefaces registered as computer programs or data base compilations). See
generally text accompanying notes 91-103 (utilitarian aspect) and sec. IV (copyright-
ability of digitally-created tone colors).
38. "[A]lmost any ingenuity in selection, combination or expression, no matter
how crude, humble or obvious, will be sufficient to render the work a writing." M.
NIMMER, supra note 32, § 108[C] at 49.
39. Id. at 48-49.
40. "Copyright protection subsists ... in original works of authorship fixed in
any tangible means of expression, now known or later developed, from which they
can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the
aid of a machine or device." 17 U.S.C. § 102(A) (1982).
41. See M. NIMMER, supra note 32, § 108[C] at 49-50. However, there are no deci-
sions which directly require tangible embodiment as a constitutional prerequisite to
federal copyright protection. Indeed, dicta exists both in support of, and in contra-
diction to, such a prerequisite. Id. The requirement's constitutional underpinnings
derive from an attempt to retain some significance to the textual use of the word
"writings." Id. at 50. Professor Nimmer notes that one court has stated that a writ-
ing must merely have "some material form, [be] capable of identification and hav[e]
a more or less permanent endurance." Id. (quoting Canadian Admiral Corp. v.
Rediffusion, Inc., Ex. C.R. 382, 383 (1954)).
42. In the purest sense, music is inherently incapable of reproduction. In an un-
intentional yet paradoxical observation on the Constitution's "writing" requirement,
the late jazz saxophonist, clarinetist, and flutist, Eric Dolphy, stated that "when you
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L. J. [Vol. 11:671
ance, and performance is not entitled to federal statutory pro-
tection.43 Only the tangible sound recording of a performance
is capable of copyright protection and, hence, possible infringe-
ment. A sampled tone color must be in tangible form to be of
any significant use,4 but either the samplist or the timbre's
creator may make the initial fixation. It is only the tangible
expression of a timbre that sampling violates, since a sample is
a material embodiment of a tone color.45 Thus, it seems that
the same embodiment that makes possible infringement
should also satisfy the constitutional "writing" requirement.
Samples may be acquired from sound recordings and live per-
formances, which are examined in section III(C)(3) of this
Note. Both sources would seem to be constitutional "writings"
if they conform to statutory requirements.46
The constitutional purpose of promoting the arts is served if
tone colors are considered copyrightable. Similarly, the copy-
hear music, after it's over, it's gone in the air. You can never capture it again." Post-
concert audience address by Eric Dolphy, Hilversum, Holland (June 1964), reprinted
in Eric Dolphy, Status (Prestige P-24070 (1977)) (liner notes by Ben Sidran). Few
would deny that an organic quality exists in live music that cannot be reproduced
even through the highest fidelity recording.
43. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973); Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury
Records Corp., 221F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1955); M. NIMMER, supra note 32, § 1.08[C] at 51.
Performers' rights per se (as distinguished from rights in performers' sound record-
ings) are probably excluded from the ambit of federal copyright protection due to
the tangibility requirement. Id. Separate consideration of the related, or neighbor-
ing, rights of performers is beyond the scope of this paper.
44. Samples may be stored, and thus fixed, in disc or chip format. See supra text
accompanying note 13. Such storage is a separate act occurring after recordation.
The initial recordation captures the sample momentarily in the "buffer" (transient
memory) of the computer, from which it is capable of being edited, played on a syn-
thesizer, or permanently stored. However, transient "buffer memory" storage does
not constitute fixation. H.R. REP. No. 2237, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 145 (1966) (reporting
on H.R. 4347, an earlier version of the current Copyright Act) (hereinafter H. REP.
No. 2237) ("[t]he discussions on this point ... further emphasized the need for a
clear definition of 'fixation' that would exclude from the concept purely evanescent
or transient reproductions such as those ... captured momentarily in the 'memory'
of a computer.") (emphasis added). Unless a timbre is either permanently "saved,"
or recorded, while being played from buffer memory, it would remain wholly evan-
scent throughout its original manifestation, sampling, and sampling use, and thus
would never pass constitutional muster as a "writing." A momentarily captured
sample not otherwise "fixed" could therefore be used in live performance without
infringement.
45. See supra text accompanying note 12.
46. However, whether or not a tone color is a "writing" within the meaning of
the copyright clause is ultimately an issue "of constitutional rather than of statutory
dimension." M. NIMMER, supra note 32, § 108[C] at 52. If a tone color is not a "writ-
ing," then it cannot be tangible under the Copyright Act.
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right clause's definition of "authors" should include creators of
tone colors, since timbre originates from the musical artist.
Tone colors should be deemed constitutional "writings," since
they result from intellectual labor and can be reduced to a ma-
terial form, from which they may be sampled.
C. Federal Statutory Copyrightability Requirements
1. Originality
Even if a work satisfies the constitutional requirements of
copyrightability, it must still fulfill statutory criteria in order
to be protected under the Copyright Act. The first require-
ment is that only "original works of authorship" qualify for
protection. However, the standard of originality is de
minimis. Both congressional intent 48 and judicial construc-
tion 49 have established that independent creation 50 is all that is
required. If an independently created work, even if identical
to a prior one, is original, it is entitled to copyright protec-
tion.5' Conversely, works that merely imitate an original do
not owe their origin to their creator and are thus not the prod-
uct of authorship.52 "[T]here must be at least some substantial
variation, not merely a trivial variation such as might occur in
47. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982) (emphasis added). See, e.g., Roth Greeting Cards v.
United Card Co., 429 F. 2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1970). However, "originality" is undefined,
as the Copyright Act "intended to incorporate without change the standard of origi-
nality established under the ... [1909] copyright statute." H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1976) (submitted with S. 22) [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 1476].
48. "This standard [of originality] does not include requirements of novelty" as
does the Patent Act. H. REP. No. 1476, supra note 47, at 51.
49. See, e.g., Runge v. Lee, 441 F.2d 579 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 887
(1971).
50. The originality requirement is "little more than a prohibition of actual copy-
ing. No matter how poor the 'author's' addition, it is enough if it be his own." Al-
fred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 1951) (partially
quoting Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 238, 250 (1903)).
51. Thus, as Judge Learned Hand stated, "if by some magic a man who had
never known it were to compose anew Keats' Ode On a Grecian Urn, he would be an
'author,' and, if he copyrighted it, others might not copy that poem, though they
might of course copy Keats." Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49,
54 (2d Cir. 1936), aff'd, 309 U.S. 390 (1940).
52. See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884). "[A]n
artist who makes such an exact reproduction of a Rembrandt that even the experts
cannot distinguish it from the original, undoubtedly exhibits great skill, training,
knowledge and judgement, but in failing to create a 'distinguishable variation,' [he]
has not ... engaged in an act of authorship." M. NIMMER, supra note 32, § 2.01[A] at
9. Cf. infra text accompanying notes 160-75 (examining the distinction in 17 U.S.C.
§ 114(b) between "actual" and "imitative" sounds).
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the translation to a different medium. '53
Although the degree of originality required for statutory
protection is slight, and the courts refuse to deny copyright-
ability for lack of artistic merit,54 there appears to be at least a
technical quantitative limitation upon copyrightability. A
fragmentary phrase5 may fall short of the de minimis stan-
dard of originality if it lacks sufficient creativity.56 The impli-
cations of this apparent limitation in relation to the
copyrightability of tone color are treated separately in sections
V(D) and VI of this Note.
2. Authorship
In addition to the constitutional limitations and the statu-
tory requirement of originality, a work must also qualify
under the federal statute as a "work of authorship." "Works
of authorship include... (1) literary works; (2) musical works,
including any accompanying words; (3) dramatic works, in-
cluding any accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and choreo-
graphic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6)
motion pictures and other audiovisual works; and (7) sound
recordings.' ,
To qualify for copyright protection, a work must either fit
into one of the statutorily delineated categories of works, or be
within the scope of works Congress intended to protect.58 The
53. L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 491 (2d Cir. 1976). See also
Durham Indust. Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1980). Professor Nimmer
notes that the originality side of copyright judicial "line drawing" will "[include] al-
most any independent effort on the side of sufficient originality." M. NIMMER, supra
note 32, § 2.01[B] at 11. "[I]f any author's independent efforts contain sufficient skill
to motivate another's copying there is ipso facto a sufficient quantum of originality
to support a copyright." Id. at 12.1 (citing Drop Dead Co. v. S.C. Johnson & Son,
Inc., 326 F.2d 87 (9th Cir. 1963)). See also supra note 33 and accompanying text.
Compare infra sec. V (discussion of compilation copyrights for digital samples).
54. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903).
55. Kanover v. Marks, 91 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
56. Professor Nimmer notes an apparent "reciprocal relationship between crea-
tivity and independent effort [where the] smaller the effort . . .the greater must be
the degree of creativity in order to claim copyright protection." M. NIMMER, supra
note 32, § 2.01[B] at 15.
57. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982). Both the drafting of the statute and the legislative
history indicate that a work need not fit neatly into one or more of the above catego-
ries to qualify for protection. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 47, at 53. However,
Nimmer notes that a similar legislative intent regarding the 1909 Act was "largely
frustrated by the courts." M. NIMMER, supra note 32, § 2.03[A] at 25.
58. Congress deliberately declined to exercise its full authority to legislatively
provide copyright protection for all possible constitutional "writings." For this rea-
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scope of protectable writings was "purposely left undefined"
to avoid freezing the scope of copyrightable subject matter at
the present stage of communications technology or allowing
unlimited expansion into areas completely outside the present
congressional intent. 9 However, a possible limit upon the
scope was suggested by the House Report accompanying a
prior version of the current Copyright Act (the "House Re-
port"), which stated that "scientific discoveries and technologi-
cal developments have made possible new forms of creative
expression that never existed before," and compared such ex-
pressions with those that have been "in existence for genera-
tions or centuries, [but that] have only gradually come to be
recognized as creative and worthy of protection."' 0 Accord-
ingly, works that have been in existence but are not within
the seven statutorily enumerated categories would probably be
excluded from the scope of protection. 1 New works, however,
that are "sufficiently analogous to the kinds of works which
are expressly protected in the seven categories" would proba-
bly be included.6 2 Acoustic tone colors are within the scope of
protectable writings because they fit within the category of
sound recordings. Although tone colors have existed for cen-
turies, protection for them has only recently become neces-
sary. Synthetically produced sounds, although new works,
seem to be analogous to sound recordings and also deserve
protection.
3. Fixation in Tangible Form
Another requirement for statutory protection is fixation in
tangible form. Under the present Copyright Act, "[c]opyright
son, the phrase "original works of authorship" was chosen rather than "all the writ-
ings of the author." H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 47, at 51.
59. Id. A further possible limitation may be found in the House Report on a
prior version of the Act, which contained an identical section to the present § 102. A
footnote there excluded unfixed performances, broadcast emissions, short expres-
sions, and color schemes, inter alia, as not per se copyrightable. H.R. REP. No. 2237,
supra note 44, at 44 n.1. See also SUBCOMM. No. 3 OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., 1ST SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION (PT. 6), SUPPLEMEN-
TARY REPORT OF REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S.
COPYRIGHT LAW: 1965 REVISION BILL 3 (Comm. Print 1965) [hereinafter REGISTER'S
SUPP. REPORT (PT. 6)] (similar limitations suggested).
60. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 47, at 51.
61. M. NIMMER, supra note 32, § 2.03[A] at 26.
62. Id. at 27. While an acoustic instrumentalist's tone is within the latter cate-
gory, a previously unimaginable tone color created through digital programming is
arguably within the former, although both are "sounds."
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protection subsists.., in original works of authorship fixed in
any tangible medium of expression, now known or later devel-
oped, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or other-
wise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a
machine or device."63 This section is an intentional legislative
overruling 64 of White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo
Co., 65 which had established the rule that a "copy" must exist
"in a form which others can see and read. '66 Thus, under
White-Smith, a "piano roll" was not considered a copy of the
musical composition which it recorded.67 Under the current
Copyright Act, however, a phonorecord is considered a sound
recording of a musical composition.68 Both sound recordings
and live performances may be sampled, and tone colors from
both these sources may satisfy the statutory fixation
requirement.
(a) Sound Recordings
Sound recordings are a fertile hunting ground for sam-
plists. 69 A "sound recording '  may "fix"" a performance in a
63. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982).
64. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 47, at 52.
65. 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
66. Id. at 17. The White-Smith definition of "copy" was implicitly adopted by
Congress in the 1909 Act. Data Cash Sys. v. JS&A Group, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1063,
1069 (N.D. Ill. 1979), aff'd on other grounds, 628 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1980). In com-
parison, the House Report accompanying the current Copyright Act states that
it makes no difference what the form, manner, or medium of fixation may
be - whether it is in words, numbers, notes, sounds, pictures, or any other
graphic or symbolic indicia, whether embodied in a physical object in writ-
ten, printed, photographic, sculptural, punched, magnetic, or any other sta-
ble form, and whether it is capable of perception directly or by means of
any machine or device 'now known or later developed.'
H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 47, at 52.
67. The White-Smith Court further held that piano rolls were merely "parts of a
machine which, when duly applied and properly operated in connection with the
mechanism to which they are adapted, produce musical tones in harmonious combi-
nation. But we cannot think that they are copies within the meaning of the copy-
right act." 209 U.S. at 18. That a "work of authorship" may qualify for copyright
protection under the present Copyright Act, even though it may be made intelligible
to humans only via a mechanical device, is an exception to the general prohibition
against granting copyright protection to works that are intrinsicaly "utilitarian" in
character. This exception is a necessary condition to according copyright protection
to sound recordings, and as such the above portion of the White-Smith holding was
overruled by the 1971 "Sound Recording Amendment." See infra sec. V; see also
infra text accompanying notes 91-103 (discussion of the significance of the exception
on the copyrightability, of digitally produced tonal colors).
68. See infra sec. IV.
69. Reich, supra note 14, at 9, col. 1. Some musical artists have included prohibi-
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"phonorecord."'72 Timbres embodied in phonorecords first
fixed after February 15, 1972,11 are tangible copies, but still
must satisfy the statutory definition of a sound recording. The
Copyright Act defines "sound recordings" in terms of a "series
of . . . sounds."74 Whether sampling timbres consisting of a
singular sound infringes as a sound recording under the Copy-
right Act is addressed in section V(D) of this Note.75
(b) Live Performances
Live performances in clubs, concerts, and studios are an-
other major sampling source. A samplist may record the per-
formance directly into a sampler, or into a conventional tape
recorder for later sampling. Although a live performance is
inherently evanescent, its embodiment in a sound recording is
considered fixed under the Copyright Act if it occurs simulta-
neously with both the performance and its transmission. 76
tions against sampling in the copyright notices on their sound recordings. See, e.g.,
Frank Zappa, Jazz From Hell (Barking Pumpkin 74205 (1986)) ("[u]nauthorized re-
production/sampling is a violation of applicable laws and subject to criminal
prosecution").
70. Sound recordings are defined as "works that result from the fixation of a
series of musical, spoken, or other sounds .... regardless of the nature of the mate-
rial objects, such as disks, tapes, or other phonorecords, in which they are embod-
ied." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). Computer chips are considered "phonorecords" for
registration purposes.
71. The Copyright Act provides that a "work is 'fixed' in a tangible medium of
expression when its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the author-
ity of the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory dura-
tion." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
72. The Act states:
'Phonorecords' are material objects in which sounds . . . are fixed by any
method now known or later developed, and from which the sounds can be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with
the aid of a machine or device. The term 'phonorecords' includes the mate-
rial object in which the sounds are first fixed.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
73. "Sound recordings" fixed prior to this date are ineligible for federal copy-
right protection. 17 U.S.C. § 301(c). However, they may obtain state common law
copyright to the same effect. See M. NIMMER, supra note 32, § 2.10[B].
74. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (emphasis added).
75. See generally infra sec. V (discussion of the statutory scope of the exclusive
rights in sound recordings).
76. "A work consisting of sounds, images, or both, that are being transmitted, is
'fixed' for purposes of this title if a fixation of the work is being made simultane-
ously with its transmission." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). The section further provides
that "[t]o 'transmit' a performance or display is to communicate it by any device or
process whereby images or sounds are received beyond the place from which they
are sent." Id.
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Sound recordings of performances thus simultaneously fixed77
and broadcast satisfy the statutory requirement of tangibility,
if not the constitutional writing requirement.78 Transmitting a
performance seems to be an unreasonable requirement for
performers who wish merely to statutorily fix their works in
this manner.79 It is clear, however, that live radio broadcasts
intended to be received by the listening public, rather than
used exclusively for fixation purposes, are statutorily tangi-
ble. o Similarly, the sound recordings of live recording studio
performances may be considered statutorily tangible.8 '
Although unauthorized samples fixed simultaneously with the
performance (as distinguished from those subsequently fixed
from the master tapes recorded at the session)82 appear to sat-
77. However, a work's fixation must occur "by or under the authority of [its]
author." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). Thus, unauthorized fixations made by audience
members are not considered tangible under the Copyright Act, although they are as
constitutionally (and practically) "tangible" as one that is authorized. Even the per-
former who transmits a performance, unless it is simultaneously fixed by or under
the performer's authority, will not have created a statutorily "tangible" work.
78. Although technically, a work that is copied at the exact moment it is fixed
(as distinguished from one that is copied a moment later), is not a constitutional
"writing" when copied, it has in fact become "tangible" at that moment. M. NIMMER,
supra note 32, § 108[C] at 52.
79. Nimmer suggests that telephoning one's performance is sufficient for this
purpose. Id. Although the statute is more limited than the Constitution's use of the
term "writings," Congress need not utilize its full constitutional power when enact-
ing copyright legislation. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 562 (1973).
80. The legislative history of the Copyright Act's definition of fixation indicates
that the simultaneous recordation requirement was enacted in order to render
broadcasts tangible. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 47, at 52. Additionally, the
Copyright Act's language describes the requirement as a method by which "work[s]
... that are being transmitted" may be considered fixed. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). See
generally 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05[F][5] (rev. ed. 1985) (discus-
sion of a possible implied "fair use" noncommercial home recording exemption for
radio broadcasts of sound recordings and live performances). Commercial use of per-
formances taped off-the-air has been held to infringe. Pacific & Southern Co. v.
Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1004 (1985).
81. The transmission requirement appears to be satisfied in the recording studio,
because the performance is "communicate[d]" by "any device" (the microphone and
tape recording equipment) "whereby... sounds are received" (by the samplist) "be-
yond the place from which they are sent" (to the recording booth from the perform-
ance studio). See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). A club or concert hall samplist of acoustic
instruments would receive the sounds beyond "the place from which they are sent."
These instruments produce sound naturally, and microphones, amplifiers, and speak-
ers transmit their sound to the audience sampler. Audience sampling of non-acous-
tic instruments, unless they are both amplified on stage and transmitted through a
public address system, would seem to occur at "the place from which [the sounds]
are sent." Id.
82. Because such tapes are recorded by the engineer under the authority of the
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isfy the transmission requirement, their unauthorized fixation
renders them statutorily invalid. 3 Thus, a performer's "sound
check"8 4 surreptitiously sampled but not otherwise recorded is
statutorily intangible if unauthorized.8 5  However, sound re-
cordings of performances that are simultaneously fixed both
by unauthorized sampling and by authorized recordations
would, by virtue of the latter, be statutorily fixed, and thus
tangible.
4. The Idea-Expression Dichotomy
A basic principle of copyright law is that the expressions of
ideas are protected, but not the ideas themselves. Section
102(b) of the Copyright Act provides that "[i]n no case does
copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend
to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation,
concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in
which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in
such work. '8 6 However, the mandate is not really a limitation
on copyrightability, but rather a measure of the degree of sim-
timbre's creator, they satisfy the Act's requirement that fixation occur "by or under
the authority of the author." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
83. See generally Jalon, supra note 14, at col. 2 (discussion of the prevalence of
this practice).
84. A "sound check" is a test performance to determine the proper microphone
position, volume, balance, etc. Sound checks present a perfect opportunity for sam-
pling, since they often consist of the playing of each note of the chromatic scale. Id.
85. A sound recording engineer's authority to fix a performance for the legiti-
mate recording may include the authority to fix the sample as well. If the perform-
ance is considered a "Work Made for Hire" under section 201(b) of the Copyright
Act, any actions committed by agents of the employer (i.e., fixations by recording
engineers under contract) may be considered to be within the scope of employment
under master and servant law. See infra note 157 (discussion of "Work[s] Made for
Hire"). Surreptitious fixations made outside of a "Work Made for Hire" employ-
ment relationship may be subject to an action under state common law for violation
of the author's right to initially fix the work. Federal statutory copyright protection
requires a work's fixation. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982). However, the Copyright Act ex-
pressly preserves the states' authority to protect unfixed works. 17 U.S.C. §§ 301(a),
301(b)(1) (1982); M. NIMMER, supra note 32, § 1.01[B]. Currently, only California ac-
cords statutory protection to unfixed works. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 980(a)(1) (West
Supp. 1986). No cases have been brought under the California statute. See Litman,
Performers' Rights in the U.S. and Japan: The Example of Digital Sampling, at 5
(lecture prepared for the June 5, 1987, meeting of the Copyright Law Society of
Japan).
86. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982). The section accords the first explicit statutory rec-
ognition of the longstanding judicially recognized idea-expression dichotomy. See,
e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
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ilarity which must exist between a copyrightable work and an
unauthorized copy for the latter to infringe.8 7
Some samplists claim that complex periodic waveforms are
not copyrightable.8 8 However, a particular complex periodic
waveform is an expression of the idea of a given fundamental
pitch. All sounds perceived as having a definite pitch exhibit
nearly periodic waveforms.8 9 Any perceptible difference be-
tween two tone colors of the same pitch (e.g., 'E flat') results
from the presence of harmonic overtones in addition to the
fundamental pitch. A pure sine wave sounding at the funda-
mental frequency, rather than overtones, determines the pitch
of a sound. Thus, a particular combination of fundamental
and harmonic sine waves produces a tone color that expresses
the idea of a single sine wave which exhibits a definite pitch."
5. The Utilitarian Aspect
Another potential roadblock to tone color copyrightability is
its usefulness as a means to expression. The limitation on the
copyrightability of "useful articles" is related to the idea-ex-
pression dichotomy. The Copyright Act defines a "useful arti-
cle" as "an article having an intrinsic utilitarian function that
is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to
convey information. An article that is normally a part of a
useful article is considered a 'useful article.' "91 Unlike patent
law, the "bundle of rights" granted by copyright "do[es] not
include the right to prevent others from using the copyrighted
87. M. NIMMER, supra note 32, § 2.03[D] at 33. The idea-expression dichotomy
and the doctrine of substantial similarity are addressed in some detail at section
V(D) of this Note.
88. Dominic Milano, Editor of Keyboard Magazine, proclaims that "[t]he bottom
line, I'm afraid, is that you cannot copyright a particular sound or a particular pitch.
That's like trying to copyright the letter 'A', and saying people can't use any words
that use that letter." Reich, supra note 14, at 9. Cf. Fryer, The Legality of Sampling
From Unauthorized Sources, KEYBOARD, Dec. 1986, at 120 (inquiry whether 'A-440'
is copyrightable). The relevant inquiry is the copyrightability of sound, not pitch.
89. See supra text accompanying note 5. The perception of a sound as represen-
tative of a particular "pitch" of the Western chromatic scale (e.g., 'A' or 'B flat')
results from the division of infinite pitch into twelve discernible parts, or "notes."
90. The argument that granting copyright in one's representation of the sound of
a given musical instrument (e.g., trumpet) would foreclose the availability of other
"tone colors" representative of that instrument is not well taken. Just as one's indi-
vidual voice is the expression of the idea of the human "voice," so too is one's partic-
ular trumpet tone the expression of the "idea" of the trumpet. As with the voice,
there exists an unlimited variety of possible trumpet tones.
91. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
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work. ' 92 Thus, those works that may not be used for the pur-
pose for which they were, designed without infringing one of
the author's potential "bundle of rights" may not be
copyrighted. 93 The doctrine was first established in the lead-
ing case of Baker v. Selden.94 Further, explanation of the art
is subject to the "use" limitation. As the Baker Court stated,
"[t]he use by another of the same methods of statement,
whether in works or illustrations, in a book published for
teaching the art, would undoubtedly be an infringement of the
copyright." 95
Although the Baker rule is not expressly codified in the
Copyright Act, it is adopted implicitly, with its reach subject to
judicial determination.96 While the Baker doctrine has devel-
92. M. NIMMER, supra note 32, § 2.18[A] at 195. The rights granted a copyright
owner by section 106 of the Act include those of reproduction, distribution, public
performance, and display. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982). Thus, one who purchases a book
may read it ad infinitum without violating any of the copyright owner's section 106
rights. In contrast, a patent owner has "the right to exclude others from ... using
... the invention." 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1982) (emphasis added).
93. Acoustically produced sounds are "designed" for the purpose of the musical
expression of their creator. In comparison, digitally created samples are "designed"
to be fungible tone colors for use in all sampling synthesizers. Assuming that an
acoustically produced tone color is otherwise copyrightable, its duplication (in sam-
ple format) would be an infringement of the owner's section 106(1) exclusive right to
duplicate the work, and the owner's section 106(2) exclusive right to prepare deriva-
tive works. See infra text accompanying notes 106-75 (discussion of right to prepare
derivative works in sound recordings). Although an acoustically produced tone color
may not be "used" as a sample without infringement in this manner, this does not
appear to bar copyrightability since duplication in sample format is not the "purpose
for which [the acoustic sound] was designed."
94. 101 U.S. 99 (1879). The Baker doctrine has been phrased as follows:[W]here the use of the 'art,' i.e., the idea, which a copyrighted work explains
(or embodies) necessarily requires a copying of the work itself, then such
copying will not constitute an infringement of copyright. However, if such
copying occurs not in using the art but rather in explaining it, then such
copying will constitute an infringement.
M. NIMMER, supra note 32, § 2.18[B] at 199.
The Baker Court denied Selden's claim of copyright in a system of bookkeeping as
embodied in a set of special forms supplied with his book. To use the system neces-
sarily required substantial copying of the forms. The Court reasoned that[w]here the art it teaches cannot be used without employing the methods
and diagrams used to illustrate the book, or such as are similar to them,
such methods and diagrams are to be considered as necessary incidents to
the art, and given therewith to the public.
101 U.S. at 103. However, the forms used by the defendant in Baker were in fact not
"substantially similar" to those of plaintiff. Thus, the system was capable of being
utilized without infringing plaintiff's forms. M. NIMMER, supra note 32, § 2.18[B] at
198.
95. 101 U.S. at 104.
96. Section 113(b) of the Copyright Act provides:
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oped into a limitation on the copyrightability of utilitarian
works, it has also received strong criticism in this regard.97
Nonetheless, where there is only one way98 or a very limited
number of ways99 to express a given idea, or where all that is
appropriated is the non-copyrightable ideas contained in a
work, the doctrine's application appears valid. 00
The question arises, then, whether tone color is uncopy-
rightable upon utilitarian grounds. A musical artist's tone
color, although utilitarian in the sense that it is a means to
expression, is intimately connected with the individual's artis-
[T]his title does not afford, to the owner of copyright in a work that por-
trays a useful article as such, any greater or lesser rights with respect to the
making, distribution, or display of the useful article so portrayed than those
afforded to such works under the law, whether title 17 or the common law
or statutes of a state, in effect on December 31, 1977, as held applicable and
construed by a court in an action brought under this title.
17 U.S.C. § 113(b) (1982).
97. Professor Nimmer notes that all works may be copied "for purposes of expla-
nation" as well as for use. It has been held that there is "nothing in the copyright
statute to support the argument that the intended use or use in industry of an article
eligible for copyright bars or invalidates its registration." M. NIMMER, supra note 32,
§ 2.18[C] at 200 (quoting Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 218 (1954)). He thus concludes
that "Baker at most . . . constitutes a defense in an infringement action where the
defendant has copied for purposes of use rather than for purposes of explanation."
Id. While Nimmer concedes the validity of denying copyrightability to a system or
method in order to prevent a monopoly in it, he argues that to deny copyright to the
expression of that system on the assumption that it embodies the only expression of
the system, is "factually erroneous," citing the lack of substantial similarity between
the forms at issue in Baker itself. Id. at 202-03.
98. Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1971),
applying Baker, holds that where a jewel-encrusted bee pin is incapable of expres-
sion in more than one form, it is thus merely an "idea" incapable of copyright pro-
tection. But cf Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Grossbardt, 436 F.2d 315 (2d Cir.
1970); Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Zale Corp., 323 F. Supp. 1234 (S.D.N.Y.
1971) (bee pin at issue in Kalpakian found infringing without discussion of Baker).
See also Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d
1157 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding that if a work's idea and its expression are indistin-
guishable, the work may be protected only as against identical copying). However, it
would seem as though nonidentical (though substantially similar) copying of the
work would establish a distinction between the work's "idea" and its "expression."
99. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678-79 (1st Cir.
1967) ("when the uncopyrightable subject matter is very narrow [and] . .. at best
only a limited number [of expressive forms are possible] . . . copyright does not ex-
tend to the subject matter at all . . . even if [plaintiff's] particular expression was
deliberately adopted"). Morrissey appears limited to circumstances where both "de
minimis copying and [the] availability of only limited number of forms of expres-
sion" exist. Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 367 F. Supp. 258, 361 (N.D. Okla. 1973) (em-
phasis original).
100. Only this limited reach of Baker is adopted by § 102(b) of the Copyright Act.
M. NIMMER, supra note 32, § 2.18[D] at 207.
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try. It is the artist's only means of expressing musical sound.
In comparison, a digitized tone color is a fungible commodity
to be traded on the open market,101 and edited or combined to
produce new sounds. While the artistry may be transformed
into the fungible commodity by sampling, the reverse is not
true.102 Between the two, only the fungible sample is poten-
tially uncopyrightable upon utilitarian grounds.103
IV.
The Copyright Status of Digitally-Created
"Tone Colors"
As noted earlier, 10 4 a digitized tone color may consist of an
exact digital recording of an "acoustically" produced sound or
sounds, a wholly samplist-created set of "programmed"
waveform instructions, or a combination thereof. Samples
may be stored in floppy discs, integrated circuit chips, or mag-
netic tape. The nature of the object in which the sample is
embodied is irrelevant to a determination of its copyright-
ability. 05 A copyrightable work must be embodied in either a
"copy''106 or a "phonorecord."'1 7 Copyrightable works are ca-
pable of being fixed only in these two mediums. 0 8 Although
101. See supra text accompanying notes 24, 28.
102. The author plays the wind synthesizer, an instrument capable of playing
samples. He uses this instrument in a manner consistent with the principles set
forth in this note.
103. See infra notes 112, 126.
104. See supra note 26.
105. This is only true for works which first acquired statutory copyright after
January 1, 1978, the effective date of the present Copyright Act. See M. NIMMER,
supra note 32, § 2.04[D] at 45. Since sampling was invented after 1978, all samples
will satisfy this condition.
106. The Copyright Act states:
"Copies" are material objects, other than phonorecords, in which a work is
fixed by any method now known or later developed, and from which the
work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either di-
rectly or with the aid of a machine or device. The term "copies" includes
the material object, other than a phonorecord, in which the work is first
fixed.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
107. See supra note 72. The rationale for the statutory distinction between "cop-
ies" and "phonorecords" arguably is unnecessary, but resulted from a legislative fear
that the White-Smith doctrine would somehow survive in the courts. The distinc-
tion makes it clear that "sounds" may be embodied in "copies." M. NIMMER, supra
note 32, § 2.03[D] at 32.
108. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 47, at 53.
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only a phonorecord may embody "sounds,"1 °9 the Copyright
Office accepts a sample for copyright registration and. deposit
only when submitted "in a form which others can see and
read."110 Although the term "phonorecord" is broad enough to
include a hard-copy printout which can be seen and read, 1'
the Office does not accord copyright protection to a sample as
a sound recording," 2 but as a "literary work.""' 3
109. Indeed, the term "copies" is defined residually, as "material objects, other
than phonorecords." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (emphasis added).
110. This limitation is tantamount to the limitation upon copyrightable works im-
posed by White-Smith v. Apollo. See supra text accompanying note 66. Telephone
conversation with a Copyright Information Specialist, Copyright Office, Library of
Congress, Washington, D.C. (Feb. 27, 1987).
111. Phonorecords are defined as "material objects in which sounds... are fixed
by any method ... and from which the sounds can be perceived ... or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device." 17 U.S.C.
§ 101 (1982) (emphasis added). Thus, a hard-copy printout can be run through a
"decompiler" to recovert it to a form that a sampler may communicate to humans,
such as a floppy disk. Further, a work qualifies as a sound recording under the
Copyright Act "regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as disks, tapes
or other phonorecords, in which they are embodied. Id. (emphasis added). See also
H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 47, at 56. Thus, a "'sound recording' copyright may
be claimed in .. .any tangible medium, including .. .player piano rolls, and other
material objects in which sounds are fixed .... ." M. NIMMER, supra note 32,
§ 2.10[A] at 140 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 47, at 56).
The Copyright Office's practice of accepting a sample for registration and deposit
only when embodied in a human-perceptible "copy" is somewhat nonsensical.- While
the Office will accept a "hard-copy" printout of the numerical contents of a sample
(e.g., "00110100110..."), it is only the auditory "display," the tone color, of a sample
that humans can perceive in any meaningful sense. The Office's rationale for the
practice apparently stems from the fact that they do not possess a sampling synthe-
sizer on which to listen to the samples. Telephone conversation with Larisa Pas-
tuchiv, Copyright Office, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. (Mar. 6, 1987).
112. The Copyright Office is currently undertaking a study to determine the
copyrightability of both digital synthesizer "patches" (programs) and digitally cre-
ated sound sources. Telephone conversation with Larisa Pastuchiv, Copyright Of-
fice, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. (Mar. 6, 1987).
A digitally stored sample is inherently no more or less a sound than is a recorded
acoustically-produced sound. Neither is a "sound" in its evanscent sense. Nonethe-
less, any digital sample clearly possesses qualities that acoustically produced sounds
do not: the abilities to be (1) transferred freely among users, (2) altered through
sample manipulation, and (3) represented "in a form which others can see and read."
This distinction imparts a utilitarian aspect to a sample that is per se nonexistent for
an acoustic tone in its pristine state. See supra text accompanying notes 91-103.
113. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (1982). "'Literary works' are works, other than audiovi-
sual works, expressed in words, numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols or
indicia, regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as books, periodicals,
manuscripts, phonorecords, film, tapes, disks, or cards, in which they are embodied."
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). The material embodiment of a literary work is irrelevant for
determining copyrightability; the work merely must be able to be perceived "either
directly or with the aid of a machine or device." 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982). Samples
DIGITAL SAMPLING
A. The Essence of the "Literary Work" Copyright and its
Relation to Digital Samples
The "essence of a literary work is ... that it consist of 'ver-
bal or numerical symbols or indicia.'"114 As such, the copy-
right context' of the term "literary" "does not connote any
criterion of literary merit or qualitative value.""' 5 The term is
expansive enough to include catalogs and directories," 6 com-
puter data bases and programs," 7 and digital samples.
The variety of literary work that a digital sample constitutes
implicates both the copyrightability of acoustically produced
sounds and the nature of the rights protected by the literary
work copyright. Samples exhibit characteristics of both com-
puter "programs,""18 and computer "data bases."'" 9 However,
while computer data bases constitute copyrightable compila-
tions "regardless of whether the individual items in the mate-
rial have been or ever could have been subject to copyright,' 20
computer programs are copyrightable only "to the extent that
they incorporate authorship in the programmer's expression
of original ideas, as distinguished from the ideas them-
selves.' 12' Thus, if a sample is copyrightable solely as a data
base compilation which is not also a "collective work,' 22 the
individual tone colors comprising it need not themselves be
copyrightable. 23 However, the copyrightability of a sample as
qualify as literary works due to their ability to be represented numerically in hard-
copy form.
114. M. NIMMER, supra note 32, § 2.04[A] at 39 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982)).
115. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 47, at 54.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. "A 'computer program' is a set of statements or instructions to be used di-
rectly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result." Act of
Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 10(a), 94 Stat. 3028 (1980) (codified as amended at
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982)).
119. Data bases are copyrightable "compilations." M. NIMMER, supra note 32,
§§ 2.04[B]-[C]. See also 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (defining "compilation" as a work
formed by the collection, assembly, selection, coordination, or arrangement of preex-
isting material; collective works are compilations).
120. H:R. REP. NO. 1476, supra note 47, at 57.
121. Id. at 54.
122. "A 'collective work' is a work, such as a periodical issue, anthology, or ency-
clopedia, in which a number of contributions, constituting separate and independent
works in themselves, are assembled into a collective whole." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982)
(emphasis added).
123. As noted supra note 12, a single tone color of a given pitch may be trans-
posed or "stretched" over the entire range of a keyboard. However, acoustic instru-
ments have definite, separable "registers" with varying tone colors. See, e.g., Fryer,
,1989) ,
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a collective work compilation or a computer program turns on
the copyrightability of the individual tone colors themselves.
It is, therefore, necessary to determine whether a sample is a
computer program or a data base.
B. Computer Programs Compared with Data Bases
The Copyright Act defines a "computer program" as "a set
of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly
in a computer in order to bring about a certain result."'24 Pro-
grams are copyrightable as literary works, since the Copyright
Act's definition of that term is broad enough to include the
hard-copy printout of a program's contents.'25 Despite concern
over the wisdom of extending copyright protection to com-
puter programs,126 both the Copyright Act 127 and case law ex-
Realistically Sampling Multi-register Acoustic Instruments, KEYBOARD, Oct. 1986, at
104. Multi-sampling is required to accurately sample acoustic instruments. See
supra note 12. However, "even if a compilation consists merely of a selection or
arrangement of [elements] which individually would not be copyrightable, the origi-
nality involved in the selection and/or arrangement of such [elements] is sufficient
to constitute the resulting compilation a protectible literary work." M. NIMMER,
supra note 32, § 2.04[B] at 41-42. It has been suggested that in order to be copyright-
able, such "selection" must exhibit "significant subjective judgement." See New
York Times Co. v. Roxbury Data Interface, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 217 (D.N.J. 1977). Fur-
ther, the "selection" may not be "dictated solely by functional considerations." Dow
Jones & Co. v. Board of Trade, 546 F. Supp. 113, 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (quoting M.
NIMMER, supra note 32, § 2.01[B] at 14). Thus, the selection or arrangement of vari-
ous multi-samples is copyrightable under the New York Times and Dow Jones tests
to the extent dictated by artistic rather than merely functional considerations.
124. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
125. See supra notes 113, 118.
126. There are three objections to the copyrightability of computer programs.
First, programs in "object code" version do not communicate any meaningful expres-
sion to humans. Note, Copyright Protection of Computer Program Object Code, 96
HARV. L. REV. 1723, 1724-26 (1983). However, the Copyright Act may require com-
munication with a human audience. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982) (requiring that a work
must be in a form from which it "can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise com-
municated"); NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPY-
RIGHTED WORKS, FINAL REPORT at 32 (1979) [hereinafter CONTU REPORT] (Hersey,
Comm'r, dissenting); Samuelson, CONTU Revisited: The Case Against Copyright
Protection for Computer Programs in Machine-Readable Form, 1984 DUKE L.J. 663
(1984); contra Note, supra, at 1730-32 (protection given to collections of facts and
literary works in binary format, neither of which meaningfully communicates to
humans; and object code can communicate to humans when being "debugged").
Second, object code programs perform a "utilitarian" function in computers, and
may be thought of as "machine parts," "embodiments of useful arts," or "processes,"
all of which are the subject of patent law. Note, supra, at 1733.
Third, object code programs are unintelligible, and unable to disclose their con-
tents to the user. Since disclosure is the quid pro quo of copyright, such protection is
at odds with copyright's textually stated purpose. See, e.g., Twentieth Century Music
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plicitly assure their copyrightability. 28  However, an under-
standing of the functional characteristics of computer pro-
grams reveals that digital samples do not fit within the Copy-
right Act's definition. The one common characteristic that all
computer programs129 share is that they "prescribe an order
for the hardware's execution of its primitive functions."'' 0
That is, computer programs interact with the computer itself
to enable it to carry out certain basic operations.'3 ' Indeed, all
programs are capable of being "hardwired" into the computer
itself. 3 2  In comparison, a digital sample merely supplies a
"sound source" which may be manipulated 33 by the sampling
Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975). In comparison, a sample's auditory display
conveys meaningful expression to humans. See infra note 196 (reference to discus-
sion of visual displays).
127. Computer programs were granted copyright status by amendment of the
Copyright Act. Computer Software Copyright Act of 1980, H.R. REP. No. 6933, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 117 (1982)). See also
H.R. REP. No. 1307, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 19 (1980); Apple Computer, Inc. v.
Formula Int'l, Inc., 562 F. Supp 775, 781 (C.D. Cal. 1983), aff'd, 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir.
1984) (noting CONTU REPORT recommendation that all computer programs be
protected).
128. See, e.g., Williams Electronics, Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir.
1982); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir.
1983); Stern Electronics, Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1982).
129. There are three types of computer programs: (1) microcode or "firmware";
(2) operating systems or "systems software"; and (3) application programs or
"software." Samuelson, supra note 126, at 676. Microcode controls the fine details
of the primitive functions of a computer, and substitutes for certain elements of the
hardware circuitry. Id. at 677. An operating system attends to the interrelation be-
tween the hardware and the application program. Id. at 678. An application pro-
gram brings about the desired result that one wants a computer to perform.
Whether or not a given program is an application program "depends on what the
user wants to do with a computer at any given time." Id. at 680. All three types of
programs are required for a computer to perform a given task, combining together to
form a "virtual" or universal machine. Id.
130. Id. at 676.
131. Id.
132. A "program itself... is a machine-control element, a mechanical device...
[that] eventually become[s] an essential part of the machinery that produces the re-
sults." CONTU REPORT, supra note 126, at 28 (Hersey, Comm'r, dissenting) (empha-
sis original). For example, a word processing program turns a computer into a word
processor. See Samuelson, supra note 126, at 681 (programs "determine . . .what
kind of machine [a] computer will be"). Samuelson views this capability as a main
objection to object code copyrightability, because "the same kind of machine, if not a
computer, would be disqualified from copyright protection." Id. at 748. Cf infra
note 134 (samplers as "universal musical instruments").
133. See supra note 12. A sampler's operating system program, rather than the
sample itself, performs this task. A sample's increased utility over an acoustic sound
results from the binary representation of the sampled sound and the sample's trans-
position from its original pitch.
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synthesizer to transform it into a particular instrument. 3 4 A
sample does not interact with the sampler to make it perform
its basic functions. As such, a sample is a "data base," rather
than a "program" in the technical sense of the word.'35
The determination that a sample is a data base, rather than
a program, is important in that the two mediums are subject
to differing copyrightability requirements under the Copyright
Act and differing deposit requirements under Copyright Office
regulations. While both are literary works, the House Report
states that the definition of literary works "includes computer
data bases, and computer programs to the extent that they in-
corporate authorship. "136 While a data base is copyrightable as
a non-collective work compilation regardless of whether or not
it is comprised of copyrightable elements, 37 a computer pro-
gram that does not "incorporate authorship" is uncopyright-
able. In comparison, the copyrightability of a sample as a
program turns on whether "authorship" was involved in the
creation of the sounds of which it is comprised. 138 However,
since a sample is a data base, a compilation copyright may be
obtained to the extent that the samplist exhibits "artistic"
originality in the selection or arrangement 139 of the sampled
sounds.
The distinction acquires added importance because the
134. Using different samples transforms a sampling synthesizer into various musi-
cal instruments, such as flute or piano; this brings about "a certain result." 17 U.S.C.
§ 101 (1982). Although a sample partially determines what kind of musical instru-
ment (machine) a sampling synthesizer (computer) is, the sampler's operating sys-
tem program transforms the unit into a "universal" musical instrument. Further, a
sample fails to satisfy the Copyright Act's definition of "program" because it is not a
"set of statements or instructions ... used ... in a computer" 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982)(emphasis added). See Note, supra note 126, at 1725 (an "instruction" makes the
computer perform its basic functions); Samuelson, supra note 126, at 684 n.76 (a
"statement" is a functional subgrouping of instructions).
135. Like a program, a sample may be "hardwired" into the synthesizer. Samples
must be distinguished from digital synthesis "patches," which are computer "pro-
grams" within the technical meaning. A synthesizer "patch" is a group of instruc-
tions that directs the settings of a non-sampling synthesizer's various parameters
(envelope generators, waveform modulators, etc.) or that computes the algorithms
that create sounds on a digital synthesizer. Because such instructions interact with
the machine to direct its primitive functions, patches are "programs" within the
meaning of the Copyright Act.
136. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 47, at 54 (emphasis added).
137. See supra text accompanying note 120.
138. Even if tone color is per se uncopyrightable, a compilation copyright may be
obtained in the selection or arrangement of "multi-samples" of an instrument's
registers.
139. See supra notes 119, 123.
DIGITAL SAMPLING
Copyright Office requires content disclosure for data base re-
gistration, but not for program registration.14 Perhaps more
significantly, the key obstacle to extending copyright protec-
tion to computer programs was the legal effect of "inputting"
copyrighted works into automated data bases.141 It was unani-
mously concluded that the insertion and storage of a copy-
righted work in a computerized data base was making a copy
within section 106 of the Copyright Act, and thus constituted
infringement unless authorized.142 Despite the Copyright Of-
fice's practice of accepting a hard-copy printout of a sample for
registration and deposit, the protection accorded is not based
on the copyrightability of the sounds embodied within the
sample; rather, protection is based on the compilation of the
selection or arrangement of the sounds.'43 Thus, a determina-
tion of the copyrightability of complex periodic waveforms, or
tone colors, must be based upon satisfaction of the constitu-
tional copyright requirements enumerated earlier in section
III(B) and the extent to which tone colors have been accorded
copyright protection as sound recordings under the Copyright
Act.
V.
The Copyright in "Sound Recordings" Under
Section 114
Performer's rights for musicians are accorded protection
140. "Data bases [and] compilations ... shall be accompanied by a ... statement
containing... the ... content of each separate file within the data base, including
the subject matter involved [and] the origin(s) of the data." The corresponding de-
posit regulation for computer programs has no such disclosure requirement. Copy-
right Office Regulations, 37 C.F.R. § 202.20(c)(2)(vii)(B) (1986) (emphasis added).
141. Indeed, CONTU was established because the debate and lobbying on this is-
sue was so intense as to seriously delay the entire effort at general revision of the
Copyright Act. See, e.g., R. SALTMAN, COPYRIGHT IN COMPUTER-READABLE WORKS
27 (1977); CONTU REPORT, supra note 126, at 39 n.163; Samuelson, supra note 126,
at 695.
142. "The protection afforded by section 106 ... seemingly would prohibit the
unauthorized storage of a work within a computer memory, which would be merely
one form of reproduction, one of the exclusive rights granted by copyright."
CONTU Report, supra note 126, at 39. CONTU determined that no statutory am-
endment would be required to recognize this right, which has been upheld in the
courts. See, e.g., Rand McNally & Co. v. Fleet Management Systems, Inc., 634 F.
Supp. 604 (1986).
143. This argument is buttressed by the fact that the Copyright Office is currently
undertaking a study to determine the copyrightability of digitally created sounds.
See supra note 112.
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under the Copyright Act only to the extent that they coincide
with the Act's protection of "sound recordings."' 44 The nature
of the rights accorded the owner of a copyrighted sound re-
cording is more limited in scope than those which may be
claimed by owners of other copyrighted works. Of the basic
rights granted a copyright owner by section 1061"5 of the Copy-
right Act, section 114146 operates to limit the rights of per-
formance and reproduction. Specifically, there are no
"performance" rights147 in sound recordings, and one is free to
144. The Copyright Act states that "sound recordings" are "works of authorship."
17 U.S.C. § 102(7) (1982). Performer's rights per se, sometimes referred to as "neigh-
boring" or "related" rights, have been explicitly recognized abroad. See generally M.
NIMMER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON COPYRIGHT AND OTHER ASPECTS OF LAW PER-
TAINING TO LITERARY, MUSICAL AND ARTISTIC WORKS, Ch. 12 (1971).
145. Section 106 provides, in pertinent part, that
subject to sections 107 through 108, the owner of copyright under this title
has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following: (1) to
reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; (2) to prepare
derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; (3) to distribute copies
or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other
transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; (4) in the case of liter-
ary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion
pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work
publicly.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982).
146. Section 114 provides in pertinent part:
(a) The exclusive rights of the owner of copyright in a sound recording are
limited to the rights specified by clauses (1), (2), and (3) of section 106, and
do not include any right of performance under section 106(4); (b) The exclu-
sive right of the owner of copyright in a sound recording under clause (1) of
section 106 is limited to the right to duplicate the sound recording in the
form of phonorecords, or of copies of motion pictures and other audiovisual
works, that directly or indirectly recapture the actual sounds fixed in the
recording. The exclusive right of the owner of copyright in a sound record-
ing under clause (2) of section 106 is limited to the right to prepare a deriva-
tive work in which the actual sounds fixed in the sound recording are
rearranged, remixed, or otherwise altered in sequence or quality. The ex-
clusive rights of the owner of copyright in a sound recording under clauses(1) and (2) of section 106 do not extend to the making or duplication of
another sound recording that consists entirely of an independent fixation of
other sounds, even though such sounds imitate or simulate those in the
copyrighted sound recording; (c) This section does not limit or impair the
exclusive right to perform publicly, by means of a phonorecord, any of the
works specified by section 106(4).
17 U.S.C. § 114 (1982).
147. The issue of "performance rights" was expressly deferred by section 114(d)
of the Copyright Act. Indeed, the issue was so volatile that it threatened the entire
revision effort. See infra notes 158-59; HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 95TH
CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON PERFORMANCE RIGHTS IN SOUND RECORDINGS (Comm.
Print 1978) (authored by Barbara A. Ringer) (report by Register of Copyrights con-
cluding that granting such rights was proper and economically feasible).
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reproduce the copyrighted work as long as he or she does not
take the "actual sounds" embodied in the recording. However,
a close analysis of the section's operation is necessary to deter-
mine the exact nature of the rights granted to owners of copy-
righted sound recordings and the relation of these rights to
the protection of individual sound source tone colors.
A. The Nature of the Rights Protected in Copyrighted Sound
Recordings
There are three separate and distinct contributions to a
"sound recording":
(1) The contribution of the authors: the musical or literary
works performed on the record, including the contributions of
the various secondary authors such as arrangers;
(2) The contribution of the performers: this includes the in-
strumental musicians and singers;
(3) The contribution of the record producer: this includes
the work of sound engineers, directors, and others who cap-
ture, edit, and mix the sounds reproduced on the record. 48
Because any federal statutory copyright in individual sound
source tone colors is dependent upon the sound's fixation in a
tangible medium of expression,149 the extent of copyright in
tone color is limited by section 114. That section's legislative
history is particularly helpful in determining the scope of the
exclusive rights accorded to sound recordings.
B. The Legislative History of Section 114
Attempts to accord copyright protection to sound recordings
include not only the more than 20 years of efforts aimed at
general revision of the 1909 Copyright Act (the "1909 Act"),
but specific legislative attempts dating to 1912.150 Although
section 114 first appeared as part of the 1976 omnibus general
revision legislation, it was not the first legislation to accord
copyright protection to sound recordings. Rather, the great
explosion of record and tape piracy in the late 1960s and early
1970s resulted in separate federal legislation prior to the omni-
148. General Revision of the Copyright Law, Study No. 5, The Unauthorized Du-
plication of Sound Recordings 1 (1958) (authored by Barbara A. Ringer), reprinted
in HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, STUDY No. 26, 87th Congress, 1st Sess. (Comm.
Print 1961) [hereinafter Ringer].
149. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982).
150. Ringer, supra note 148, at 18-38.
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bus legislation.- The 1971 "Sound Recording Amendment" (the
"1971 Amendment") to the 1909 Act was enacted as temporary
legislation,' and later made permanent by further amend-
ment in 1974.152
Despite the 1971 Amendment's admitted purpose as an anti-
piracy statute,'5 3 granting federal copyright protection to
sound recordings required the recognition of the artistic con-
tributions of performers. Since the subject matter of
copyright law is limited to the "writings of authors," the rec-
ognition of this contribution was crucial in keeping the legisla-
tion within the Copyright Act. The mere inadequacy of non-
copyright legislation to combat the piracy problem 5 4 is not
grounds for a remedy in copyright.
Copyright protection was perceived as benefitting perform-
ers, 5 5 and it became clear that explicit recognition of their
artistic contribution was long overdue.156 Nonetheless, the
identity of the owner of copyright in sound recordings is not
specified in the language of either the 1971 Amendment or the
current section 114.' That the copyright owner's identity is
151. Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, § 3, 85 Stat. 391 (1971) (amended
1976).
152. Act of Dec. 31, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-573, § 101, 88 Stat. 1873 (1974) (amended
1976).
153. "AN ACT to amend title 17 of the United States Code to provide for the
creation of a limited copyright in sound recordings for the purpose of protecting
against unauthorized duplication and piracy of sound recordings, and for other pur-
poses." Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (1971) (short title); See also H.R. REP. No.
487, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1974) [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 487] (compositional copy-
right inadequate to prohibit piracy, and piracy deprives performing artists of royal-
ties, legitimate manufacturers of income, pension and welfare funds of contributions,
and governments of revenues).
154. State common law actions such as unfair competition and misappropriation
were perceived as inadequate to combat piracy. H.R. REP. No. 487, supra note 153, at
2-3.
155. Prohibiting Piracy of Sound Recordings, 1971: Hearings on S. 6 Before the
Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1971)
[hereinafter Hearings (1971)] (benefits of encouraging performers' continued em-
ployment and contributions to society, and concern that listening public attributed
poor quality of pirated recordings to the artist).
156. Id. at 14-15 (testimony of Barbara Ringer, former Register of Copyrights, re-
viewing judicial statements that a performer's interpretation of a composition is enti-
tled to copyright because a composition by itself is an incomplete work, and that an
artist's intangible property right, though always present, was impossible to violate
and thus unnecessary to assert prior to sound recordings. Note that this reasoning is
equally true for sampling.) See also REGISTER'S Supp. REPORT (PT. 6), supra note 59,
at 50 (aggregate of sounds in a sound recording clearly satisfies constitutional "writ-
ing" requirement); accord, H.R. REP. No. 2237, supra note 44, at 93.
157. This omission is significant. First, explicit statutory identity of the copyright
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unmentioned is not, however, fatal to a determination that
section 114 accords an interest to the performer. Although an
explicit division of such ownership would have been necessi-
tated had performance rights158 been granted to the owner of
copyright in sound recordings, the grant of copyright protec-
tion is in fact based upon the contributions of both the per-
formers and the record producer. Indeed, the omission of
performance rights appears merely to be an effort to complete
the revision process, rather than a limitation of the section to
an "anti-piracy" provision. 5 a
owner would help prove that the section was not included within the Copyright Act
merely to preserve record company risk capital. See Hearings (1971), supra note 155,
at 25 (statement of Stanley M. Gortikov, representing the Recording Industry Asso-
ciation of America, Inc.) (only. ten percent of released records recoup investment
costs, and only hit records earn profits, but since hit records cannot be predicted,
investment can't be confined to them). Usually, only hit records are "bootlegged,"
allowing pirates to "cream skim" the only profitable product of legitimate record
companies.
Second, statutory identity of the copyright owner would help resolve a record com-
pany's conflicting interests with performing artists. The 1971 Amendment was sup-
ported by "the entire music industry." Id. at 6 (statement of Hon. Richard H. Fulton
(Tennessee)). In comparison, digital sampling pits producers and record companies,
eager to reduce costs, against performers, particularly "backup" musicians. One con-
flict occurs when an artist's performance on one record is utilized on another record
produced by the same company. A detailed analysis of copyright ownership princi-
ples is beyond the scope of this paper. See generally M. NIMMER, supra note 32, Ch.
6.
Another conflict results from the Copyright Act's "Work Made for Hire" doctrine.
See 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1982) (copyright vests initially in the author of the work); 17
U.S.C. § 201(b) (1982) (the employer or other person for whom a "work made for
hire" is prepared is the "author" and owns the copyright absent contractual agree-
ment). Unfortunately, "almost all sound recordings ... made in the United States
are made under contracts that expressly provide that the performer's contributions
are works made for hire." Litman, supra note 85, at 4. Professor Litman suggests
that such performers may sue as a beneficial owner of copyright or persuade the
copyright owner to bring suit. Id. at 12. See supra note 85 (implications of the
"Work Made for Hire" doctrine on fixation).
158. "Performance rights" would extend the compulsory license system used for
musical compositions to radio, jukebox, and night club disc jockey performance of
sound recordings. See generally M. NIMMER, supra note 32, § 8.04.
The "Williams Amendment" defined "performers" and sought to implement per-
formance rights. S. 597, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 113 CONG. REC. 7078 (1967) (adopted by
the Senate to the then-pending copyright revision bill, S. 543, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1969)). See also S. REP. No. 1219, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1970) (amendment divides
ownership of performance rights between record producers and performers); Ringer,
supra note 148, at 47-48 (commenting that administrative convenience favors owner-
ship by record companies, while artistic contribution favors ownership by perform-
ers, and that revision legislation should clearly indicate ownership).
159. Due to the fiercely opposed economic interests of copyright owners (record
companies and performers) and users (broadcasters and jukebox owners), adoption
of an amendment which deleted the performance royalty appeared crucial to the
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The recognition of a performance right, in addition to enti-
tling performers to long overdue compensation for the com-
mercial usage of their works, would have explicitly divided the
ownership of copyright in sound recordings evenly between
the record company and the aggregate of performers, thus ex-
plicitly recognizing the contribution of the performers them-
selves. This grant of rights would have not only further
grounded the inclusion of sound recordings within the consti-
tutional ambit of the "writings of an author," but explicitly
recognized that the prohibition against duplication was based
upon something other than the preservation of record com-
pany "risk capital." The performer would have had an explicit
statutory basis for recognition of his or her performance, apart
from any contribution of the record company, economic or
otherwise. Nonetheless, it can safely be concluded that recog-
nition of the performers' contribution to a sound recording is
(1) implicit in section 114, notwithstanding the absence of ex-
plicit inclusion, and (2) was in fact crucial to copyright protec-
tion of sound recordings. Section 114's inclusion within the
Copyright Act protects a fixed musical performance as a per-
formance, rather than merely as a sound recording. The next
section of this Note examines the extent to which sampling
violates this protection. It explores tone colors and their rela-
tion to sound recordings as "derivative works" of such
recordings.
C. The Scope of the Exclusive Right to Prepare Derivative
Works in "Sound Recordings"
A derivative work 160 is an original work of authorship161
passage of general revision legislation. S. 1361, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 120 CONG. REc.
30287 (1974); see also Draft Second Supplementary Report of the Register of Copy-
rights 12 (1975) (unpublished) [hereinafter Register's Report (1975)]. The absence of
performance rights was "not meant to imply any disparagement of sound recordings
as creative works or any doubts as to their copyrightability." REGISTER'S Supp. RE-
PORT (PT. 6), supra note 59, at 51-52. The rationale appears wholly practical: "[t]he
tremendous impact a performing right in sound recordings would have throughout
the entire entertainment industry . . . would make the general revision bill so con-
troversial that the chances of its passage would be seriously impaired." Id.
160. A derivative work is defined as
a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation,
musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture ver-
sion, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any
other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A
work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other
[Vol. 11:671
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that is based on, or derives from, a prior work or works. Thus,
a sound recording is itself a derivative work of a musical com-
position, and a digital sample is a derivative work of the sound
recording from which it is taken. The owner of copyright in a
sound recording is granted by section 114(b) the exclusive
right to prepare derivative works under section 106(2).162
An exclusive right to prepare derivative works was not in-
cluded in either the 1971 Amendment or the early drafts of
section 114. The right first appeared in an earlier draft of the
revision legislation 16 3 as the inclusion of section 106(2) within
the rights accorded the owner of copyright in a sound record-
ing in section 114(a). However, the wisdom of including the
right relates back to a comment made at a 1964 Draft Discus-
sion on the general revision effort.164
The rationale for excluding the right from the 1971 Amend-
ment was to clarify that independent fixations of perform-
ances imitative of the copyrighted sound recording were per-
mitted.165 However, the absence of the exclusive right to pre-
modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is
a "derivative work."
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
161. The copyright in a new version of a work covers only the material added and
has no effect on the original work's copyright status. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note
47, at 57. Further, to be an infringement, the derivative work must be "based upon
the copyrighted work [and] .. .must incorporate a portion of the copyrighted work
in some form." Id. at 62. Finally, "[t]he exclusive right to prepare derivative works
...is broader than [the right of reproduction] ...in that reproduction requires
fixation [whereas a derivative work may infringe] even though nothing is ever fixed
in tangible form." Id.
162. See supra notes 145-46.
163. S. 22, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 106(2) (1975) (as recorded out by Comm. on Ju-
diciary). The accompanying Senate Report merely states that "[s]ubsection (a) of
Section 114 specifies that the exclusive rights of the owner of copyright in a sound
recording are limited to the rights to reproduce, [and to] prepare derivative works
.... .S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 87-88 (1975).
164. OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION LEGISLATIVE HISTORY PART 3 PRELIMINARY
DRAFT FOR REVISED U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW AND DISCUSSIONS AND COMMENTS ON THE
DRAFT 199 (1964) [hereinafter PRELIMINARY DRAFT](Leon Kellman of the American
Guild of Authors and Composers, commenting that the draft should clearly indicate
that the right to make imitative "mirror" copies does not include the right to use
actual sounds from the imitated recording).
165. REGISTER'S SUPP. REPORT (PT. 6), supra note 59, at 52 (only to avoid an impli-
cation that the sound recording copyright owner has rights against unauthorized imi-
tation or simulation of the performance embodied in the recording, but not to
authorize substantial reproductions of the copyrighted work, whether or not edited
or combined with other sounds).
Editing software allows samples to be "reverse-engineered" by decompiling them
into binary form (e.g., "0110011001"), which may conceivably be notated by hand and
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pare derivative works left a "loophole"'1 66 in the 1971 Amend-
ment, which was soon realized in United States v. Taxe. 167 The
inclusion of an exclusive right to prepare derivative works was
implemented at the request of the Justice Department, 168
which had completely missed the concern regarding imitative
works expressed in the Register's 1965 Report.169 The Copy-
right Office concurred in the Justice Department's concern,'70
and the Department's recommendations1 71 were adopted by
the Senate in its Report on the then-pending legislation.
Under section 114(b) as finally adopted by the Copyright
Act, a sound recording copyright owner's exclusive right to
prepare derivative works does not extend to the preparation of
then re-inputted to digitized status. This practice appears to use the actual sounds,
rather than their imitatations, since manual labor is merely substituted for a
machine process, with identical results. The same argument, if unpersuasive in the
context of a digital audio tape duplication of a compact disc, would in effect sanction
piracy outright.
166. "As [the sections] ... are presently written, it might be possible to 'pirate' a
sound recording simply by adding certain additional sounds, music or otherwise, and
claim the resulting work to be a derivative work outside of the scope of protection
for sound recordings." 4 OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION LEGISLATIVE HISTORY PART
5 - 1964 REVISION BILL WITH DISCUSSION AND COMMENTS 317 (Comm. Print 1965)
(comments of Professor Nimmer).
167. 380 F. Supp. 1010 (C.D. Cal. 1974) (unauthorized duplication infringes a
sound recording notwithstanding superficial changes, such as altering the recording's
speed, adding or deleting frequencies and tones, or adding sounds from a synthesizer,
and infringing work need not be characterized as a derivative work to so find, but
criminal infringement found only if the final product is recognizable as the original),
aff'd, 540 F.2d 961 (9th Cir. 1976) (doctrine of substantial similarity applied by inclu-
sion of comparison test between the two works). See generally A. MILLER & M. DA-
VIS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHT IN A
NUTSHELL 400 (1983) (record piracy is one of the few areas of copyright that involves
possible criminal liability).
168. The Justice Department was concerned that "[t]here is a real possibility that
an unauthorized duplicator who made a 'derivative' work by slightly altering the
original copyrighted sound recording would claim that he did so legally since the
copyright owner is given no exclusive right to make derivative works." Copyright
Law Revision: Hearings on H.R. 2223 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties
and Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. 137 (1975) [hereinafter Hearings (1975)]. "Proposed section 114 should be
amended to provide for the copyright owner.., to have the right to make derivative
works or... to clarify that persons other than the copyright owner do not have such
a right absent consent . . .notwithstanding the fact that the . . .copyright owner
would have no such right." Id.
169. REGISTER'S SUPP. REPORT (PT. 6), supra note 59, at 52.
170. Hearings (1975), supra note 168, at 1397.
171. The problem "could be eliminated by including part (2) of section 106 in the
list in section 114 of exclusive rights granted to a sound recording copyright owner
... an action which would grant to . . .[such an owner] no more rights than they
presently possess." Id. at 137.
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works which consist "entirely of an independent fixation of
other sounds."'72 This limitation resulted from the Copyright
Office's concern that granting copyright owners the exclusive
right to prepare derivative works would prohibit unauthorized
persons from preparing imitative recordings, 73 although the
House Report accompanying the enacted legislation merely
hints at this concern.'74 As enacted, section 114(b) was thus
intended to close the "loophole" existing under the 1971
Amendment while still permitting truly independent fixations
of imitative unauthorized recordings. The term "entirely"
limits the meaning of "independent fixations of other sounds"
to prohibit recordings where the copyrighted sound recording
was altered in an attempt to dodge the 1971 formula. A sam-
ple taken from a sound recording does not consist "entirely"
of "independent fixations of other sounds," and therefore does
not merely imitate the tone color contained within. Rather, a
sample takes an actual sound from the recording, which is not
permitted by section 114. However, a sample from a sound re-
cording may involve momentary sounds which are a de
minimis amount of copyrighted material. 75 The next section
explores whether there is a minimum quantitative measure
below which an appropriation would not infringe a sound
recording.
D. Section 114(b)'s "All or Any Substantial Portion" Limitation
on Copyright Infringement and the Doctrine of
"Substantial Similarity"
A literal reading of section 114(b) would prohibit any unau-
thorized sampling of copyrighted sound recordings since such
samples do not "[consist] entirely of . . . independent fixa-
tion[s] of other sounds."'76 However, the House Report accom-
panying the 1976 Act indicates that "infringement takes place
172. See supra note 146 (17 U.S.C. § 114 (b)). The limitation also extended to "du-
plication" of these independent fixations. Id.
173. Hearings (1975), supra note 168, at 1906; Register's Report (1975), supra note
159, at 22 (unpublished report supporting derivative work right, but reflecting con-
cern that language might be interpreted to prohibit "mirror" recordings, which are
permissible because they are "independent fixations of other sounds").
174. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 47, at 106.
175. Sample length may range from 5 milliseconds for the taking of one note, to
more than two minutes, as when phrasing and drum patterns are sampled. See
supra note 12 and accompanying text.
176. 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (1982) (emphasis added).
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whenever all or any substantial portion of the actual sounds
that go to make up a copyrighted sound recording are repro-
duced ... by repressing, transcribing, recapturing off the air,
or any other method."177 While a short sample would arguably
not satisfy this standard in quantitative terms, there is no stat-
utorily imposed "floor" below which an appropriation is not
considered infringing. Further, the courts have found in-
fringement where a quantitatively de minimis appropriation
constitutes a qualitatively significant portion of the copy-
righted work.17  Conversely, where the appropriated material
is nonessential to the copyrighted work, though of quantitative
significance, no infringement has been found.179  It seems,
then, that since tone color is an essential component of a
sound recording, the taking of even one note should constitute
infringement.
The doctrine of "substantial similarity" is used to determine
if an appropriation constitutes an infringement. Substantial
similarity between the copyrighted work and any alleged in-
fringement thereof "is an essential element of copying.' 8 0
Yet, determining whether a work is substantially similar to
177. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 47, at 106 (emphasis added). But cf. Taxe, 380
F. Supp. 1010, 1014 (concluding that neither "the most trivial re-recording (the re-
recording of one or two notes)" nor a re-recording unrecognizable as the original
would constitute infringement under the 1971 Amendment). However, the 1971
Amendment contained no derivative works clause. If Taxe was the original impetus
for the derivative works clause, the fact that neither the statute itself nor the accom-
panying House and Senate Reports contemplate Judge Hill's concerns is indeed curi-
ous. Note that Taxe clearly contemplated sampling as nearly as possible in 1974. Id.
at 1010.
178. Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., 482 F. Supp. 741, 744
(S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd, 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1980) (four notes out of 100 measures
found to be "heart of the composition" and thus infringing although the copying was
found to be a "fair use," and thus defendant was not held liable); Harper & Row,
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 723 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1983), rev'd, 471 U.S. 539,
565 (1985) (.0015% of the work infringing, as "heart of the book"); Henry Holt & Co.
v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 23 F. Supp. 302 (E.D. Pa. 1938) (three sentences
held infringing); Higgins v. Baker, 309 F. Supp. 635 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (motion for sum-
mary judgment denied; appropriation of only 0.8% of plaintiff's work may be enough
to infringe copyright due to qualitative significance); Meredith Corp. v. Harper &
Row, Publishers, Inc., 378 F. Supp. 686, 690 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd, 500 F.2d 1221
(2d Cir. 1974) (The district court noted that "even a small usage may be unfair if it is
of critical importance to the work as a whole and taken by the infringer in order to
save the time and expense incurred by the copyright owner.").
179. See, e.g., Jewel Music Publishing Co. v. Leo Feist, Inc., 62 F. Supp. 596, 597
(S.D.N.Y. 1945) (similarity of three bars of an eight-bar phrase held noninfringing,
though it appeared 24 times in both songs).
180. M. NIMMER, supra note 32, § 13.03[A] at 20. Fundamentally, "there are only
two elements necessary to the plaintiff's case in an infringement action: ownership
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another "presents one of the most difficult questions in copy-
right law. 181 Judge Learned Hand stated that "[t]he test for
infringement of a copyright is of necessity vague"182 and that
the line "wherever it is drawn, will seem arbitrary."'' 8 How-
ever, at least with respect to unaltered samples, questions as
to the degree of abstraction between the two works are irrele-
vant, since a portion of the copyrighted material has been lit-
erally appropriated. Thus, an unaltered sample may at most
constitute what has been termed "fragmented literal similar-
ity," 8 4 since the similarity between the two works is not com-
prehensive in nature. 85 As with non-literal similarity, a
determination of whether infringement has occurred "in the
last analysis requires a value judgement."'8 6 The classic guid-
ing judicial principle in making this determination was stated
by Justice Story: "If so much is taken, that the value of the
original is sensibly diminished, or the labors of the original
author are substantially to an injurious extent appropriated by
another, that is sufficient, in point of law, to constitute a
piracy pro tanto.' ' a7 However, a determination of when such
"sensible diminution" or "injurious appropriation" occurs is
ultimately a question for the trier of fact, based on the "impor-
tance of [the] material which is common to both parties'
works.'1 8  Given that a comparatively small degree of qualita-
tive similarity will establish infringement with regard to artis-
tic works, 8 9 and since a musician's "sound" is perhaps the
most indispensible, distinguishing, and fundamental aspect of
their artistry, 90 it seems that the requisite qualitative similar-
of the copyright by the plaintiff, and copying by the defendant." Id. § 13.01 at 3
(footnotes omitted).
181. Id. § 13.03[A] at 20.
182. Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir.
1960).
183. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1930).
184. M. NIMMER, supra note 32, § 13.03[A][2] at 35.
185. "Comprehensive literal similarity occurs when two works are literally identi-
cal with respect to a quantitatively substantial portion. However, most copyright
litigation involves comprehensive non-literal similarity, where, rather than a literal
taking, the "fundamental essence or structure of one work is duplicated in another."
Id., § 13.03[A] at 20.1.
186. Id. at 39.
187. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
188. M. NIMMER, supra note 32, § 13.03[A] at 39.
189. Id.
190. It has been said that a musical artist's sound "is their soul." Conversation
with Marcus Belgrave, jazz trumpeter, Detroit, Mich. (Nov. 19, 1988).
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ity necessary to establish infringement should normally be
found to exist. 9 '
Proving infringement when a sample is made of combined
or altered tone colors is more complex. Such a sample may
cross the line between the permissible taking of one's "idea,"
and the prohibited taking of one's "expression" of that idea.
192
Although the appropriation is still literal, the sample can be
too dissimilar to the original tone color to infringe. The prob'-
lem is one of detection. Judge Learned Hand's famous "ab-
stractions test,' 93 and Professor Zechariah Chafee's "pattern
test" 94 are both helpful in determining whether the line has
been crossed.'95 Additionally, the use of auditory and visual
191. Where the appropriated copyrighted material represents the "heart" of
plaintiff's work, it will be found to infringe even when the taking is quantitatively
de minimis. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539,
565 (1985) (Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court, found that approximately 300
words of Gerald Ford's autobiography, A Time to Heal, purloined in a magazine arti-
cle were "essentially the heart of the book." Since Ford's complete manuscript was
200,000 words, the amount taken was a mere .0015% of the work). See also Salinger
v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 98-99 (2d Cir. 1987) (material that is "at least an
important ingredient" is sufficiently qualitatively significant even if. it is not the
"heart of the book.").
192. The principle has been codified. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). See also supra text
accompanying notes 86-90 (discussion of the "idea-expression dichotomy" within the
context of the Copyright Act).
193. The test states:
Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of patterns of
increasing generality will fit equally well, as more and more of the incident
is left out. The last may perhaps be no more than the most general state-
ment of what the play is about, and at times might consist only of its title;
but there is a point in this series of abstractions where they are no longer
protected, since otherwise the playwright could prevent the use of his
"ideas", to which, apart from their expression, his property is never
extended.
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1960).
194. The test states:
No doubt, the line does lie somewhere between the author's idea and the
precise form in which he wrote it down. I like to say that the protection
covers the "pattern" of the work . . . the sequence of events and the devel-
opment of the interplay of characters.
Chafee, Reflections on the Law of Copyright, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 513-14 (1945).
The test helps to determine where the level of abstraction crosses the line between
expression and idea.
195. Since the problem is both abstract and concrete, the tests should be consid-
ered together. M. NIMMER, supra note 32, § 13.03[A] at 22-23. The tests may be
viewed, respectively, as models of deconstructive and reconstructive component anal-
ysis.
Hand's "abstractions test" could be applied in sampling by comparing printouts of
the waveforms. Since tone color results from a complex periodic waveform consist-
ing of a particular series of harmonic sine wave partials, a complex periodic
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waveform displays to compare the complex waveforms at issue
with pure fundamental pitch sine waves and with the most ba-
nal waveforms that sound like the relevant instrument may be
helpful, particularly when a sample from a "sound library"
subject to a literary work copyright as a computer data base is
at issue.1
96
The use of these comparative methods appears appropriate
since the standard used by the trier of fact in copyright in-
fringement proceedings is that of the "ordinary observer," or
lay audience.197
VI.
The Defense of "Fair Use"
Even if copyright infringement is found, a defendant may
escape. liability through the defense of "fair use." While a
comprehensive analysis of the defense is beyond the scope of
this paper, a cursory application of the doctrine to sampling
indicates that sampling does not constitute "fair use.' 1 98
"Fair use" is a judicially created doctrine which places limi-
waveform is an "expression," rather than merely an "idea." This is evident in that
at the lowest level of "abstraction," where sucessive layers of tonal "incident" are
"left out," a singular sine wave of the fundamental "pitch" is all that remains. By
comparison to a graphic printout of either a pure sine wave, or a complex periodic
waveform of the most banal series of sine waves which would minimally character-
ize the particular instrument in question, the degree of "abstraction" by which the
waveforms differ both from each other and from the fundamental "pitch" could be
determined.
Similarly, Chafee's "pattern test" could be applied by "dissecting" the waveforms
through computer editing to determine the similarity of the frequency and ampli-
tude placement of the individual sine wave "partials" of which the sounds are com-
prised, to the number of "partials" that survived alteration intact, and to the overall
similarity of the shape of the individual complex waveforms.
196. The standard test of computer copyright infringement is limited to a compar-
ison of binary-digit printouts. See generally Note, Defining the Scope of Copyright
Protection for Computer Software, 38 STAN. L. REV. 497 (1986) (argument that visual
and auditory "displays" of computer programs should be used in software infringe-
ment cases).
197. See generally M. NIMMER, supra note 32, § 13.03[E] at 46-60. The author's
own experience with lay audiences is that they often cannot distinguish the tonal
difference between a trombone and an oboe, much less the difference between the
tones of two players of the same instrument.
198. Professor Nimmer notes that a determination of whether "fragmented literal
similarity" constitutes infringement "cannot be answered without a consideration of
the purpose for which the defendant's work will be used." M. NIMMER, supra note
32, § 13.03[A] at 36. The "purpose" of defendant's work is one of the factors consid-
ered in determining whether a use is "fair." Id.
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tations on the exclusive rights of copyright owners. 9 9 The
doctrine is flexible, and "permits courts to avoid rigid applica-
tion of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle
the very creativity which that law is designed to foster. '200
The codification of the doctrine was "intended to restate the
... judicial doctrine of fair use, not to change, narrow, or en-
large it in any way."2 0 ' Four nonexclusive factors are to be
considered in application of the doctrine: "(1) the purpose and
character of the use, including whether the use is of a com-
mercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the
nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substanti-
ality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as
a whole; and (4) the effect on the potential market for or
value of the work. '20 2
Commercial 20 3 sampling points against a finding of fair use,
though such use merely weakens, and is not fatal to, a fair use
defense.20 4 Both the sample and the appropriated work- are
creative works, which also points against a finding of fair
use.2 0 5 Whether or not the appropriated work is published is
significant.20 6 While the quantitative amount of the portion
199. It is "a privilege in others than the owner of copyright to use the copyrighted
material in a reasonable manner without his consent." Harper & Row, Publishers,
Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 549 (1985) (quoting H. BALL, LAW OF COPY-
RIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 260).
200. Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 621
F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1980).
201. Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 1476 at 66).
202. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
203. Many samplists are noncommercial hobbyists. Such use points towards a
finding of fair use. Also relevant to the 'character' of the use is the "propriety of
defendant's conduct." Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 462 (quoting 3 M. NIMMER, NIM-
MER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05[A] at 72-73 ("[flair use presupposes 'good faith' and 'fair
dealing' ")). Use of the work despite a declined request is not lack of "good faith," at
least in the context of parody. Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 437 (9th Cir. 1986). How-
ever, the "perceived merit" of either plaintiff's or defendant's works should not be
considered. Haberman v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 626 F. Supp. 201, 210 (D.Mass.
1986).
204. Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d 1171.
Yet "every commercial use ... is presumptively an unfair exploitation . Sony
Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984).
205. New York Times Co. v. Roxbury Data Interface, Inc., 434 F.Supp. 217 (D.N.J.
1977).
206. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564 ("[t]he fact that a work is unpublished is a
critical element of its 'nature' . . . the scope of fair use is narrower with respect to
unpublished works."); cf. Salinger v. Random House, 811 F.2d 90, 97 (2nd Cir. 1987)
("[n]arrower 'scope' seems to refer to the diminished likelihood that copying will be
fair use when the copyrighted material is unpublished," not that "the amount of
copyrighted material that may be copied as fair use is a lesser quantity for unpub-
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sampled may suggest a fair use defense, the qualitative sub-
stantiality of a sampled tone color is significant under the
third factor of Section 107, and strongly works against fair
use.
20 7
The effect on plaintiff's potential market or the work's
value "is undoubtedly the single most important element of
fair use. '2 °  The factor asks "whether unrestricted and wide-
spread conduct of the sort engaged in by the defendant
(whether in fact engaged in by the defendant or by others)
would result in a substantially adverse impact on the potential
market for or value of the plaintiff's present work.
'20 9
lished works than for published works"). See supra note 84 (sampling of sound
checks).
207. The third factor "includes a determination of not just quantitative, but also
qualitative substantiality," and "may be regarded as relating to the question of sub-
stantial similarity rather than whether the use is 'fair.'" M. NIMMER, supra note 32,
§ 13.05[A][3] at 78. The quantitative aspect of the test looks to how much of the
copyrighted work was appropriated, without considering how much noninfringing
material constituted the infringing work. The qualitative test looks to the value of
the copied material whether or not a substantial portion of the infringing work con-
sists of appropriated material. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 565. See also Sheldon v.
Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 56 ("no plagiarist can excuse the wrong
by showing how much of his work he did not pirate.") (L. Hand, J.). Note that a
momentary sample used as a synthesizer sound source may constitute a significant
portion of the infringing work.
208. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566. The relevant test is not whether the infring-
ing work may potentially "destroy or diminish the market for the original ... but...
whether it fufills the demand for the original." Fisher, 794 F.2d at 438 (emphasis
original). However, even an appropriation which may diminish the interest in the
original work, yet not totally displace the market for the original, may weigh slightly
against fair use if consumers may mistake the appropriation for the original. Salin-
ger, 811 F.2d at 99. The propriety of the market effects test "is not lessened by the
fact that [the] author has disavowed any intention to publish ... during his lifetime."
Id.
209. M. NIMMER, supra note 32, § 13.05[A] at 79. The inquiry "must take [into]
account.., harm to the market for derivative works." 471 U.S. at 568. This factor is
not directed towards the harm potentially suffered by plaintiff's future works. Con-
sumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. General Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044, 1050 (2d Cir. 1983)
("The Copyright Act was not designed to prevent such indirect negative effects of
copying. The fourth factor is aimed at the copier who attempts to usurp the demand
for the original work.").
However, Consumers is distinguishable on its facts from sampling. Consumers in-
volved the potential erosion of a magazine sales market due to fear that defendant's
commercial use "could lead the public to view Consumers Union as an unfair tester
of products." Id. In comparison, sampling may affect the market for any of plain-
tiff's works, past, present, and future, due to the utilitarian nature of a sample. If a
musician's tone is an inherent quality of their artistry, an appropriation which may
serve to obviate the future need for that artistry may hardly be adjudged fair. See
also Marcus v. Rowley, 695 F.2d 1171, 1177 (9th Cir. 1983) ("The mere absence of
measurable pecuniary damage does not require a finding of fair use.").
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L. J.
Whether the fourth factor of Section 107 points towards or
away from fair use depends upon one's definition of a "work."
While the potential market for or value of the sound recording
from which a sample is taken may not be appreciably dimin-
ished by samples used to create new works not imitative of the
original, the effect upon the musician's market as a musician
may well be significantly eroded.210
It seems, therefore, that the work protected by a sound re-
cording is not merely the immediate commercial product, but
the tangible performance as a performance. The textually
stated purpose of copyright,21' the inclusion of sound record-
ings within the Copyright Act,212 and the basic concept of fair
use213 all support this conclusion. A sample's utility is pre-
cisely the reason why sampling is unfair to the sound's origi-
nal creator, and is the very cause of future adverse economic
effects upon the original artist. An infringment should not be
excused because of its value to the infringer.
Conclusion
Tone colors are artistic expressions deserving of protection
under the Copyright Act. While digital technology benefits
the reproduction of music by offering increased fidelity and by
producing new sounds, it also makes possible the theft of an
important musical asset. This theft is easily accomplished and
can occur in any setting.
Granting copyright protection to musical tone colors pro-
motes the arts, the textually stated purpose of copyright.
Tone colors are "writings" in the constitutional sense. The
creation of tone colors requires intellectual labor, and
210. See supra notes 14, 15, 18, 22, and 29.
211. See supra note 30. When used as substitutes for acoustic instruments, sam-
plers do not "promote the arts" or "stimulate creativity." They are best used to cre-
ate new sounds, not to obviate the creators of existing sounds. The eventual demise
of the performing arts may hardly be termed "progress." See supra note 29.
212. "Sound recording" copyrights were in part based upon the preservation of
employment opportunities for performers. See supra note 155. Such copyrights rec-
ognize the inherent existence of a musician's property right in their performance.
See supra note 156. A performance's tangible recording permits it to be copyrighted.
In comparison, a sample's utility cuts against its copyrightability. Both of these qual-
ities are necessary to allow samples to infringe sound recordings. It would indeed be
curious if sampling were to erode sound recording copyrights because of this utility.
213. The guiding rationale of fair use is to avoid "stifl[ing] the very creativity
which [the copyright] law is designed to foster." Iowa State Univ. Research Found.,
Inc. v. Am. Broadcasting Co., 621 F.2d 57, 60 (2nd Cir. 1980).
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although musicians do not enjoy "performance rights" under
the Copyright Act, tone colors become tangible when embod-
ied in sound recordings or when sampled.
Tone colors also meet federal statutory requirements for
copyrightability. They are tangible expresssions of works of
authorship, assuming that they become permanently stored at
some point. Although they are useful to their creator as a
means of musical expression, they are not utilitarian in the
way a sample of them is utilitarian to a synthesist. Addition-
ally, tone colors are a true expression and not merely an un-
copyrightable idea, since their varieties are virtually limitless.
A digital sample of a tone color is copyrightable as a literary
work data base compiliation under the Copyright Act. Tone
colors should be copyrightable as a sound recording under the
Copyright Act. The grant of copyright protection to sound re-
cordings implicitly recognized the performance contributions
of musicians. The derivative works right available in sound
recordings permits imitation, but not the sampling of actual
sounds from the recording. Although a sample may be of a
small portion of a sound recording, the importance of tone
color to the recording is significant enough to render such a
sample an infringement.
The test of substantial similarity will reveal whether a sam-
ple infringes a tone color. Auditory and visual displays of the
tone color's waveforms can help prove whether or not the
sample takes actual sounds from a sound recording, especially
when the tone color has been altered or combined. Finally, a
careful application of the doctrine of fair use should ordinarily
not excuse a sample from infringement.
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